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Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why

Disability Law Claims Are Different

S. ELIZABETH NVILBORN MALLOY*
I. INTRODUCTION

Described as one of the century's most significant pieces of civil rights

legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990' has been widely
hailed as establishing a new foundation for disability policy

Senator

Harkin, the primary sponsor of the law, called it "the 20th century Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with disabilities."3 President Bush preAssociate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law, J.D. Duke Law School, 1991;
B.A. College of William and Mary, 1988. Many thanks to Matthew M. Malloy for all of his support
and help with this project Thank you also to Professor Ronald J.Krotoszyski, Professor Suja Thomas, and the University of Cincinnati College of Law faculty for their comments, and to Susan Bender
and John Melvin for their excellent research assistance.
1. Officially known as the Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities Act, but popularly
referred to as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (1994)). Before the passage of the ADA, Congress hA
enacted the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals by federal
agencies, private employers with federal contracts, and recipients of federal funds. Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1994 & Supp. 1111997). Although the Rehabilitation Act made
some strides in reducing disability discrimination, Congress found that disability discrimination still
persisted in such critical areas as employment in the private sector. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6
(1989). The ADA therefore extended the Rehabilitation Act's non-discrimination provisions to cover
most of private sector employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Because the ADA was viewed in
some ways as an extension of the Rehabilitation Act, relevant case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act has been deemed generally applicable in interpreting analogous sections of the ADA and has
had many of the same difficulties with interpretation. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g) (1999). This
Article therefore cites to Rehabilitation Act cases where helpful to analyze these comparable difficulties
under the ADA.
2. E.g., 136 CONG. REC. 17,376-77 (1990) (statement of Sen. Dole) (discussing the final passage
of the ADA); 135 CONG. REC.19,807 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (asserting that the ADA"has
the potential to become one of the great civil rights laws of our generation"); JOSEPH P. SHAPRO, NO
PITY: PEOPLE wiTH DISABI.ITIES FORGING ANEW CVIL RIGHTS MOVMENT 52, 144 (1993) (discussing the ADA's role in a broader struggle for the civil rights of people with disabilities).
3. 136 CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin, chief sponsor of the ADA) (describing the ADA as the "Emancipation Proclamation" for the disabled). Senator Harkin also stated "history
is going to show that in 1990, 26 years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 million Americans with
disabilities gained freedom, dignity and opportunity-their civil rights." Id. at 17,366.
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dicted that the Act would "open up all aspects of American life to individuals with disabilities" and end the "unjustified segregation and exclu-

sion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life."'
Congress enacted the ADA to ensure "equality of opportunity, full par-

ticipation, independent living and economic self-sufficiency" for disabled
individuals.' To achieve these goals, Title I of the ADA provides a "com-

prehensive national mandate" to end discrimination against individuals
with disabilities in the workplace.6 Title I is intended to "remove barriers
which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the
same employment opportunities that are available to persons without disabilities." 7 The ADA was not conceived as an affirmative action statute,8
4. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1070-71
(July 26, 1990). Senator McCain proclaimed "This landmark legislation will mark a new era for the
disabled in our Nation." 136 CONG. REc. 17,364 (1990) (statement of Sen. McCain). Senator Hatch
stated that "America will be a better place, a far better place because of the actions we are about to take
today." Id. at 17,365 (statement Sen. Hatch); see also id. at 17,730 (statement of Sen. Metzcnbaum)
("The ADA ensures that the great civil rights advances of this century no longer exclude Americans
with disabilities. And that ...signals an important turning point in our history."); id. at 17,371 (statement of Sen. Simon) (stating that the ADA represents a "'declaration of independence' for the citizens
with disabilities of this Nation."); id. at 17,374 (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("This legislation will bring
fundamental changes to American society.").
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 801 (1999)
("The ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against disabled individuals in order both to
guarantee those individuals'equal opportunity and to provide the Nation with the benefit of their consequently increased productivity."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 10 (1989) (describing the ADA's "critical
goal" of "allow[ing] individuals with disabilities to be part of the economic mainstream of our society'); 135 CONG. REc. 19,892 (1989) (statement of Sen. Biden) (emphasizing the goals of participation, integration, independence, self-determination, and self-sufficiency). See also U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 5 (1983) [hereinafter
SPECTRUM] (contrasting the difference between one who is truly "handicapped" versus one who simply
suffers from a disability).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(bXl). The findings further explain that individuals with disabilities are:
a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals' [ability] to participate in, and contribute to, society.
Id. § 12101(a)(7).
7. 29 C.F.R app. § 1630 (2000). For excellent discussions of the ADA and its impact, see RUTH
COLKER & BONNIE POITRAs TUCKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY (2000) (providing a general overview
and analysis of the ADA and relevant case law); LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW
18-30 (1992) (giving an overview of the ADA provisions relating to employment and public accommodations); Peter David Blanck, Employment Integration,Economic Opportunity, and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: EmpiricalStudyfrom 1990-1993, 79 IOwA L. REV. 853 (1994) (presenting the results
of the ADA's effect on 4000 adults and children with mental retardation); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 (1991) (analyzing the anticipated effect of the ADA on future
civil rights litigation); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990.An Overview, 22
N.M. L. REV. 13 (1992) (analyzing each section of the ADA); The Americans with DisabilitiesAct
Symposium: A Viewfrom the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 371 (1991) (providing historical background to
the passage of the ADA by individuals who helped ensure its enactment).
8. See infra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
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but rather as one of equal opportunity, set forth "to enable disabled persons
to compete in the workplace based on the same performance standards and
requirements that employers expect of persons who are not disabled."9
These laudable goals have yet to be realized. Ten years after the enactment of the ADA, studies have shown that people with disabilities continue to see virtually the same disadvantages in the labor market that they
experienced prior to the enactment of the ADA.'0 The disabled have not
seen a decrease in their unemployment rate since 1990.11 Aggravating the
problem, studies show that employers win an astonishingly high percentage
of Title I cases under the ADA. 2 Indeed, some commentators have stated
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (2000).
10. For discussions of the disability and the labor market, see IMPLIENTINo THE AmERICANS
wrrT DISABILmES ACt (Jane West ed., 1996) [hereinafter IMPLIENTING THlE ADA] (assessing the
effects of the ADA from the perspective of business, government, and people with disabilities; and
concluding that while fears of high costs and massive litigation have not materialized, neither have
many of the hoped-for benefits); Walter Y. Oi, Emplo)ment and Benefits for People with Diverse
Disabilities,in DISABILITY, WORK,AND CASH BENEFITS 103 (Jerry L Mashaw ct al. eds. 1996); Susan
Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans uith DisabilitiesAct. Part 111.
Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?,21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L 271 (2000) (stating that the
ADA has not led to increased employment for the disabled and citing recent studies to show the disabled individual's lack of progress in gaining access to employment).
11. Press Release, National Organization on Disability, Americans with Disabilities Still Face
Sharp Gaps in Securing Jobs, Education, Transportation and In Many Areas of Daily Life, (July 23,
1998), available at http'//www.nor.org/presssurey.html (hereinafter N.O.DiHaxris Survey] (survey
commissioned by the National Organization on Disability finding that unemployment rates for the
disabled remain much higher than for the population as a whole with only sixty-five to ,,venty-one
percent of the disabled working). This same survey found that thirty-four percent of adults with disabilities lived in a household with an income of less than $15,000 a year compared to twelve percent of
those without disabilities. let; see generallyLaura Turpin et al, Trends in Labor ForceParticipation
Among People with Disabilities 1983-1994, DISABILITY STATS. REFrr. (June 1997) (Disability Sts
Ctr., San Francisco, CA). Findings from the 1998 National Organization on Disability/Harris Survey of
Americans with Disabilities indicate that twenty-nine percent of individuals with disabilities surveyed
in 1998 were employed. N.O.D.Harris Survey, supra. This figure compares with thirty-one percent
employed in 1994, and with thirty-four percent employed in 1986. Id. See generally Marcia Pearce
Burgdorf& Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of UnequalTreatment: The Qualificationsof Handicapped
Persons as a 'Suspect Class' Under the Equal ProtectionClause, 15 SANTA CLARA L REV. 855, 86199 (1975) (documenting widespread social discrimination against individuals with disabilities).
12. Ruth Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HAav. C..C.L. L. REV. 99,99-100 (1999) (noting that in the first eight years of the ADA, businesses overwhelmingly prevailed in ADA employment cases at both the trial and appellate court levels); John 1. Parry,
ABA Survey ofEmployment DiscriminationCases Brought Under the Americans ith DisabilitiesAct,
DAILY LAB. REP., June 22, 2000, at El (stating that of the 434 Title Icases decided in 1999, 95.71
resulted in employer wins and 4.3% in employee wins, and noting that in some circuits, no employee
wins occurred); Darryl Van Duch, Employers Win in MostADA Suits, NAT'L U., June 29, 1998, at BI
(reporting the results of the ABA's Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law study that
showed that in over 1200 ADA cases filed since 1992, employers had won ninety-two percent of cases
decided by a judge); see also NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP:. A DECADE OF
FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES ACT (2000) (arguing that courts have
been "ill-informed, if not outright hostile" to the ADA, and that this hostility has led to "problematic
federal court interpretations of key ADA principles" that have narrowed the scope of the law's protections).
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that "the ADA's track record in improving employment opportunities for
individuals with disabilities appears dismal."' 3 These findings have led
many disability advocates to question whether the ADA can lead to an improvement in employment opportunities for disabled persons. 4

Commentators have begun to seek an explanation for the ADA's failure to increase employment opportunities for the disabled. 5 Some blame
Congress for what they see as a poorly worded statute with so many vague
terms as to render the legislation unworkable. 6 Others argue that the Act

stimulates so many frivolous claims that the effectiveness of the ADA
against real cases of discrimination is undermined.'

Finally, some fault

the courts for overly narrow interpretations of the ADA

8

and for a failure

13. Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 10, at 272. For a general overview of attitudes concerning
the implementation and effectiveness of the ADA's Title 1, see Peter David Blanck & Mollie Wcighner
Marti, Attitudes, Behavior, and the Employment Provisionsof the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 42
VILL. L. REv.345 (1997).
14. See Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals? 549 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 37, 52 (1997) (concluding that the ADA is "least likely to help those workers
with disabilities who are most disadvantaged in the labor market"); Oi, supra note 10, at 103 (stating
that the ADA has not produced the anticipated growth in employment rates of the disabled); Lisa J.
Stansky, OpeningDoors, 82 A.B.A. J. 66, 66 (1996) (noting lack of consensus regarding whether ADA
was meeting its goals); Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX, L. R1tV.
1969, 1970 (1994) (describing the ADA as a "compromise that is failing"); Scott A. Moss & Daniel A.
Malin, Note, Public Fundingfor Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discriminationand the Disabilitiesof the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 198 (1998) ("Tlhe
ADA has not been as effective as hoped at increasing employment among persons with disabilities");
Steven A. Holmes, In 4 Years, DisabilitiesAct Hasn t Improved Jobs Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994,

at A22.
15. This is not to state that the ADA has not had a dramatic impact on raising the level of awareness about disability discrimination as well as promoting an enhanced view of capabilities of the disabled. See generally Laura F. Rothstein, Reflections on DisabilityDiscriminationPolicy-25 Years, 22
U. ARK. L. REV. 147 (2000) (noting the courts problematic interpretations of the ADA but stating that

there has been dramatic improvement in America's disability policy and in the general awareness of the
disabled).
16. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 625 (1999)

(noting that the ADA's definition of disability is "notoriously, albeit intentionally vague and thus
subject to varying interpretations"); Lisa Eichhom, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life
Activities: The Failureof the 'Disability'Definitionin the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 77
N.C. L. REv. 1405, 1423 (1999) (the ADA's "compromising, unworkable definition [of disability] too

often has prevented legitimate lawsuits from going forward"); Stephen W. Jones, The Supreme Court
Reins in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 U. ARK. L. REV. 183 (2000) (discussing how the

courts' narrow definition of disability has dramatically limited the scope and application of the ADA);
Wendy Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: JudicialInterpretationsof the Meaning of
Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. LAB. L. 53, 79 (2000) (reviewing the courts' interpretation of Con-

gressional intent).
17. See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People With Disabilities Expected to Work?,
549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. ScI. 71, 80-81 (1997); James Bovard, The Disabilities Act's
ParadeofAbsurdities, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1995, at A16 (describing suit arising from mental disabilities); George F. Will, Protectionfor the Personality-Impaired,WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1996, at A31
(discussing the inclusion of mental impairment as disability under the ADA).
18. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection From Disability Dis.
crimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42
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to fully comprehend the nature of discrimination faced by disabled individuals.' 9

This Article agrees that the interpretation of the ADA by the courts has
had a profound influence on the ability of the disabled to gain access to the
workplace and focuses on one aspect of the courts' interpretative strategy-the reliance on Title VII precedent. 20 The frequent use of Title VII
case law and its burden-shifting scheme suggests that the courts have often
failed to understand that the ADA is fundamentally a very different type of
statute than other anti-discrimination laws. 21

In most courtrooms, Title VII employment discrimination cases have
comprised the bulk of the caseload regarding workplace discrimination.

Title VII had been around for twenty-five years when Congress enacted the
ADA, and it was so well established that Congress borrowed some statu-

VILL. L. REV. 409,415 (1997) (stating that legal analysis under the ADA has proceeded quite a long
way "down the wrong road"); Ruth Colker, supra note 12, at 160 (speculating that "conservative judges
may simply be hostile to the ADA"); Arlene B. Ma)rson, Restoring Regardfor the "RegardedAs"
Prong: GivingEffect to CongressionalIntent,42 VILL L REV. 587, 587, 612 (1997) (discussing "disturbing trend" in the case law and criticizing the "[h]ypetechnical, often illogical, interpretations of the
ADA" in recent decisions). See generally Steven S. Locke, The IncredibleShrinking Protcetcd Class:
Redefining the Scope ofDisabiliyUnderthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 68 U. COLO. L REv. 107
(1997) (critiquing decisions interpreting the ADA's definition of disability); Luther Sutter, The Ameri.
cans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990: A RoadNow Too Narrow, 22 U. ARK. L REV. 161 (2000) (describing the "unmitigated hostility many courts hold toward the ADA"); Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially
Crafted Barriersto Bringing Suit Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 38 S. TEX. L REv. 907
(1997) (analyzing decisions rejecting ADA challenges on threshold issues).
19. See Harlan Hahn, Accommodationsand the ADA: UnreasonableBias or Biased Reasoning, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166,166-67 (2000) (discussing the "lack ofunderstanding" between nondisabled and disabled and the "failure to reach a consensus about the meaning of concepts and terms
that are crucial to an interpretation of the [ADA]"). High unemployment rates for the disabled continue
despite the fact that studies show the disabled are excellent employee. The United States Civil Service
Commission studied appointments of severely handicapped workers in federal agency jobs over a ten
year period. It found the employment records of the disabled employees to be "excellent." See SPECTRUM, supra note 5, at 30. For example, F.1. DuPont de Nemours & Co. is a private employer who
recruits and monitors handicapped employees and reports many successful case stories. See Id.
20. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits discrimination in employment on
the basis of race, national origin, sex and religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
21. Other commentators have also recognized the potentially significant problems in drawing
analogies between different forms of discrimination. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuringthe Importance of Race: The Implication ofMaking ComparisonsBetween Racism and Sexism
(or Other-Isms), 1991 DUKE LJ. 397, 398-410 (1991) (explaining in particular how comparing sex
discrimination to race discrimination inadvertently may marginalize and obscure the role of race and
the unique history of racism); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen. Disabilities.Discrimination.
and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE LJ. 1 (1996) (contrasting the ADA, epecially its duty to
make reasonable accommodations, with other non-discrimination schemes and affirmative action). Yet
analogies and comparisons are "necessary tools to teach and explain," to "deepen our consciousness,"
and to "permit us to progress in our thinking." Grillo & Wildman, supra,at 398,400. Using analogies
thus "provid[es] both the key to greater comprehension and the danger of false understanding." Id. at
398. See generallySPECTRUM, supra note 5, at 147-58 (discussing the difficulty of importing Title VII
discrimination concepts into the area ofdiscrimination on the basis of disability).
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The judiciary's

familiarity with Title ViI's employment discrimination doctrine and the
similarity in wording between the two statutes inevitably led to importation
of some of the concepts developed under Title VII to ADA cases. This is

neither surprising nor inappropriate in some instances because Congress
intended both statutes to address employment discrimination against relatively large protected classes. Unfortunately, an over-application of Title
VII precedent has frequently frustrated the claims of ADA plaintiffs.

The ADA relies on a different vision of equality to address workplace
discrimination. Disabilities, unlike race, often have a direct impact on a
person's ability to perform certain jobs.' Therefore, unlike race, disability
is frequently a legitimate consideration in employment decisions.24 For
this reason, the ADA relies on the mandate of reasonable accommodation
to enjoin employers to alter job requirements in response to an individual's
disability.'

Under the reasonable accommodation principle, the employer

is not just required to treat a person with a disability like a non-disabled
person. Rather, the statute requires the employer to take the disability into
22. See Infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
23. The ADA does not rely solely on this different treatment conception of equality. In situations
in which a disability does not impact an individual's ability to perform the job in question, the ADA's
prohibition on discrimination requires that people with disabilities be treated the same as others. See
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 10 (stating that similar treatment is not equal treatment In the
case of the disabled); see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning
ofReasonableAccommodation and Undue Hardshipin the Americans with DisabilitlesAct, 139 U.PA.
L. REV. 1423, 1435 (1991) ("Whereas the non-discrimination mandate under Title VII may be implemented through equal treatment, the orientation of the workplace toward individuals who are not disabled means that mere equal treatment will leave in place substantial barriers to equal opportunity.");
Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the PlayingField or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of PerceivedDisabilityClaims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 958 n.236 (1999) ("[Djifferential treatment
is often necessary to eliminate such discrimination.").
24. See Paul Steven Miller, Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigmfor the Twenty-First Century: The Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender, andAge, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 511,
514 (1997) (noting that "the traditional civil rights model of treating people 'exactly the same'.does not
apply to disability discrimination"). The core of Title VII's non-discrimination mandate has always
been understood as the idea that similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. See generally
Paul Brest, In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976) (discussing the
principle disfavoring classifications and other decisions based on race or ethnic origin).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5)(A) (defining discrimination to include the failure to make reasonable accommodations). Title VII contains a very limited version of an accommodation right for religious-based discrimination. See id. § 2000ea) (prohibiting employment decisions based on religion
"unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business"). Because religion raises constitutional questions under the Establishment Clause
that are not raised in the disability context, courts have interpreted Title VIl's religious accommodations provision extremely narrowly. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 6-7. Because the
religious accommodations provision in Title VII places employers "under only a very slight legal
obligation," that provision is not comparable to the unique, broad accommodations rule in the ADA.
Id. at 7; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1989) (distinguishing the ADA's "significant"
accommodation duty from Title VII's "insignificant" duty to accommodate religious beliefs).
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consideration and modify the workplace accordingly. Moreover, because
every disability is unique, the ADA relies on a highly individualized and
contextual vision of equality. The reasonable accommodation requirement
does not simply mandate that a group be treated differently; it requires that
each person within a group be treated differently2 Accordingly, the ADA
expressly contemplates that employers will take affirmative steps on behalf
of employees and applicants with disabilities that they do not take for employees without disabilities.' Therefore, the reasonable accommodation
requirement is based upon a more complex conception of equality than the
simple29 notion that the disabled and non-disabled should be treated the

same.

Current case law fails to appreciate the differences between the ADA
and Title VII, and thus it does not promote Congress' goal of remedying
workplace discrimination against the disabled. The reasonable accommodation language in the ADA is one of the provisions that uses language
borrowed from Title VII. However, under Title VII, this language has
been given an extremely narrow interpretation by the Supreme Court.
Recognizing that this narrow interpretation might thwart the legislative
intent behind the ADA, Congress explicitly stated that the ADA's reasonable accommodations requirement should be interpreted without regard to
the Title VII provision. However, this intent was not codified in the statute. Therefore, if the courts ignore this legislative history and apply Title
VII's more restrictive view of reasonable accommodation to the ADA,
disabled plaintiffs face a much higher obstacle in gaining reasonable accommodation than Congress intended.
The borrowing of other Title VII provisions, such as the requirement
that discrimination be intentional, has also been detrimental to plaintiffs
bringing eases under the ADA. Most discrimination against the disabled
26. See S. R.P. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989) (explaining that disability discrimination "includes harms
resulting from the construction of transportation, architectural, and communication barriers and the

adoption or application of standards and criteria and practices and procedures baed on thoughtlessness
or indifference"); 136 CONG. REC. 10,870 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) (asserting that "it is not
disability which limits one's ability to participate in life, but it is societal barriers"); 135 COXO. REa
19,800 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (asserting that it is often not the disability that is limiting, but
"the obstacles placed in the way by an indifferent society").

27. Miller, supra note 24, at 520 (noting that the "individualized, person-by-person approach ofthe
ADA is a departure from the traditional civil rights approach embodied in Title VII, which lays dovm
broad and general rules that apply to all employees and employers across the board.").
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). Among the numerous objectives of the ADA, one is to
eliminate such discrimination by forcing employers to be more flexible with reset to the employmet
of disabled persons through a process known as "reasonable accommodation." Id. § 12111(9). Unfortunately when employers have resisted this mandate, the ADA has been an alarmingly ineffective
weapon in courts for the disabled plaintiff Colker, supra note 12, at 101-02.

29. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text; see also Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at
10-11 (1996) (discussing how the "difference model" of discrimination differs from the "samness
model" in that it requires employers to treat some disabled persons differently than other individuals);
Miller, supra note 24, at 514.

HeinOnline -- 33 Conn. L. Rev. 609 2000-2001

CONNECTICUTLAWREYIEW

[Vol. 33:603

has been described as "benign neglect," in contrast to the animus directed
at some of those groups protected under Title ' II. In other words, employers do not necessarily disfavor disabled persons, but simply fail to
consider their needs when designing the workplace. For example, an employer might have an unwritten policy preventing the hiring of minorities.
This demonstrates an intent to discriminate. However, if the same employer has a building that requires climbing a stairway to gain entrance, it
is likely that the employer never considered the impact of those steps on
physically disabled individuals. Thus, it is rare for intentional discrimination to play a role in ADA cases. Because most of the discrimination experienced by disabled individuals results from this indirect discrimination,
applying Title VII intent requirements can have a disastrous impact on a
disabled plaintiff's ability to recover for discrimination.
Courts have not fully appreciated the differences in discrimination that
occur when dealing with the disabled and have often mechanically applied
Title VII case law. Because of this failure, court decisions often demonstrate an unfocused and unprincipled examination of both the nature of
disability discrimination and the corresponding duty of accommodation.
Moreover, the court decisions relying on various aspects of Title VII
precedent appear inconsistent, and contain no guiding principles about
when it is appropriate to borrow from Title VII. Without these guidelines,
decisions often appear to be result-oriented and hostile to the claims of the
disabled.' °
This Article argues that if the courts are to fully implement Congress'
expressed intent to provide equal employment opportunities for individuals
with disabilities, they must not apply Title VII precedent to the ADA uncritically; but instead they must recognize the subtle ways in which the
statutes differ. Part II of this Article traces the statutory sources of the
ADA in Title VII, revealing a continuity of language but a discontinuity of
underlying policy between the two statutes. Part II also examines the issues raised by the different conceptions of discrimination in the two statutory schemes and the difficulties the courts face when evaluating the different methods the statutes use to achieve equal employment opportunity.
Part III examines three areas of employment discrimination case law in
which the courts have borrowed mechanically from Title VII to interpret
the ADA and have significantly reduced the effectiveness of the statute.
Specifically, this Article examines the use of Title VII's reasonable accommodation provisions, the application of Title VII's constructive discharge standard, and the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
30. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What

Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 301 (1987) (suggesting that the division between minorities and Critical Legal Studies scholars results from a fundamental difference between the goals of
the two groups); Mark V. Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: A PoliticalHistory, 100 YALS L.J. 1515
(1991) (seeking to analyze the role of politics in an area that is not simply an intellectual movement).
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test applied to reasonable accommodation inquiries in ADA cases. In each
instance, the application of the Title VII standard undermines the basic
goal of Title I of the ADA. The Article concludes by providing a theoretical framework for devising new anti-discrimination concepts under the
ADA in a way that recognizes the inevitable influence of Title VII doctrine. In lieu of the hit-or-miss borrowing from Title VII that occurs today,
this Article offers a blueprint for developing a more coherent approach to
addressing employment discrimination under the ADA.
II. THE CONCEPT OF NON-DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE AMERICANS

WrrH DISABILITIES ACT

A. Responding to DisabilityDiscriminationin Employment: The Statutory
Originsand Structure of the ADA

Title I of the ADA prohibits most private employers from engaging in
disability-based employment discrimination.3

Specifically, the ADA

broadly prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual," with
regard to all terms and conditions of employment, including hiring, training, compensation, advancement, and termination.32 This general prohibi-

tion translates into three specific requirements for stating a disability discrimination claim. 3 First, the plaintiff must have a "disability." Second,
the plaintiff must be an "otherwise qualified individual with or without

reasonable accommodation" for the job. Third, the employer must take an
adverse employment action against the plaintiff because of the plaintiffs

disability.
An individual may establish that he has a "disability" by showing that

31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994 & Supp. Ill 1997). Since July 26,1992, Tite I of the ADA
has applied to all private employers that are "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" and that
employ "15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." Id. § 1211 1(5)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e() (2000) (defining which employers are covered by the ADA).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (providing Tecific examples of the types of
employment decisions that may not be influenced by an individual's disability status).
33. See, eg., Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (defining the
requirements of a prima facie case under the ADA).
34. Marshall, 130 F.3d at 1099; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); Erica Worth Harris, Controlled
Impairments Under the Americans iith Disablities Act: A Search for the Meaning of Disability, 73
WASH. L. REv. 575, 584 (1998) ("While class membership is essentially assumed under other antidiscrimination schemes such as Title VII, one must actually establish class membership to sue under
the ADA."); see also Crossley, supra note 16, at 623-24 (describing the "rash of litigation overwho has
a disability").
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that substantially limits 36 one or

more major life
The ADA's disability definition also includes
individuals who have "a record of' or are "regarded as having such an im-

pairment, '" ' as well as those who actually have such an impairment.39 The

inclusion of individuals who have "a record of' or are "regarded" as having
a disability reflects Congress' recognition that social practices and structures result in many people being classified as disabled even though they

have no physical or mental limitations."
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12202(a); see, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1999);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630 (1998). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
regulations define three of the terms in this statutory definition ofdisability:
(h)physical or mental impairmentmeans
(1)
Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
36. EEOC regulations define a substantial limitation as one that significantly restricts an individ.
ual's ability to perform one or more "major life activities" as compared with an "average person in the
general population." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The legislative history of the Act suggests that
Congress intended the requirement of a "substantial" limitation as a way of eliminating claims based on
de minimis or trivial impairments. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (holding that,
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, an impairment "serious enough to require hospitalization" was
"more than sufficient to establish that one or more of [the plaintiffs] major life activities were substantially limited"); H.RL REP.No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990) (explaining that "[a] person with a minor,
trivial impairment, such as a simple infected finger is not impaired in a major life activity"). See generally Cheryl L. Anderson, "Deserving Disabilities". Why the Definition of Disability Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act Should be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 Mo. L. REv. 83 (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). Major life activities include the "basic activities that the
average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty." 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.2(i) (adding sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching to the list of major life activities set forth in the
statute); see, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 (holding that reproduction is a major life activity).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,541 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting that many physical or mental impairments "are not in fact disabling but are believed tobe
so, and the people having them may be denied employment or otherwise shunned as a consequence,"
and that "[s]uch people, objectively capable of performing as well as the unimpaired, are analogous to
capable workers discriminated against because of their skin color or some other vocationally irrelevant
characteristic"); see Locke, supra note 18, at 109 (arguing that judicial efforts to determine whether an
individual has a disability under the ADA are inconsistent with the statute's purpose).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2XC). The definition of disability also prohibits discrimination against an
individual who associates with a person with a disability. Id. § 12112(b)(4).
40. In Sch. Bd. v. Arline, a case interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court explained
that the definition ofdisability reflects:
Congress' concern with protecting the handicapped against discrimination stemming not
only from simple prejudice, but also from "archaic attitudes and laws" and from "the fact
that the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps." To combat the effects of erroneous but nevertheless
prevalent perceptions about the handicapped, Congress expanded the definition of "handicapped individual" so as to preclude discrimination against "[a] person who has a record of,
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After satisfying the first requirement of having a "disability," the plaintiff must fulfill the second ADA requirement: that the plaintiff is a "quali-

fied individual" for the job.' The determination that an individual with a
disability is "qualified" requires a finding that the individual can, "with or
without reasonable accommodation, ... perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds or desires."
For a task to be an "essential function" or a "fundamental job dutyJ of
the employment position,"' 3 the employer must actually require the em-

ployee to perform the duty. Removing the duty must alter the position
fundamentally.' Thus, a particular task may be essential "if the reason that

the position exists is to perform that function," if the work is highly specialized and the applicant is hired specifically to perform the task or if a
or is regarded as having, an impairment [but who] may at present have no actual incapacity
at all."
480 U.S. at 279 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting S.REP. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974)).
More recently, the Supreme Court has limited the definition of disability such that the ADA's scope has
been narrowed. See, eg., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (holding that an individual's disability must be considered with reference to any mitigating measures).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). These requirements have received some criticism. Se Matthew
Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans %ith DisabilitiesAct and
FederalDisabilityBenefit Programs,76 TEX. L REV. 1003,1023-24 (1998). Diller statc,
[t]o satisfy the first inquiry, an ADA plaintiff must argue that medical impairments either
impose, or are perceived as imposing, substantial limitations on the ability to perform basic
life activities. However, to satisfy the second statutory requirement, the plaintiff must argue
that despite these actual or perceived limitations, he or she is capable of performing the job
in question. A plaintiff who appears only slightly impaired risks failure to satisfy the definition of disability, while a plaintiff who appears too impaired may be found "not qualified" to
perform the job.

Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). If a reasonable accommodation cannot enable the disabled employee to
perform of the essential functions of the job, then the employee is not "othetwize qualified" and is not
covered under the statute. Id. § 12113(a).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2000). See, eg., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131,
140-41 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the question whether "classroom management-the ability to maintain appropriate behavior among the students-[is] an essential function of a tenured library teacher's
job" and setting out a framework for answering questions regarding the essential functions of particular
jobs).
44. "Essential functions" are defined as "the fundamental job duties of the employment position"
and do not include "the marginal functions of the position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Courts must
give consideration to the employer's judgment about which job functions are essential and treat prior
writtenjob descriptions as evidence in making that assessment. Id § 1630.2(n)3)(t).i). In addition,
employers are not required to accommodate disabled individuals by eliminating essential functions
from the job. See Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that an eccommodation is unreasonable "if it would necessitate modification of the essential nature of the program" or if it would subject the employer to "undue burdens, such as extensive costs"); see also Milton
v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that grocery vwarehouse stockers
were not qualified when they could not perform essential function of job, where reduced production
stsndards or designation of lighter work load was not a reasonable accommodation); 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630 background (explaining that, although the ADA "focuses on eradicating barriers," employers still
may apply the "same performance standards and requirements that employers expect of persons who
are not disabled").
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limited number of employees exist to whom the employer could redistribute the task.45 Duties that fall outside the essential job functions are considered "marginal, ' and disabled employees are still considered "qualified" even if they cannot perform marginal job tasks."7 Because the ADA
affirmatively obligates employers to provide reasonable accommodations
to allow disabled employees to perform essential job functions, the failure
to do so is considered a form of disability discrimination.48 For example,
employers have been required to provide different equipment and furniture
for disabled employees, as well as to allow disabled employees to maintain
more flexible work schedules and break times.49
In general, reasonable accommodation includes any type of modification or adjustment to the operational work environment, 0 including the
manner or circumstances in which the position is customarily performed, to
allow a disabled employee to do the job. 1 The obligation to provide rea45. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(nX2)(i)-(ii). The EEOC also instructs courts to consider:
(iii) [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) [tihe consequences
of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) [the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) [t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii)
[t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii)-(vii); see id. app. § 1630.2(n) (providing examples of these criteria).
46. Seesupranote38.
47. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(finding a disputed issue of fact as to whether plaintiff, who could not drive, could perform the essential
functions of his job because defendant failed to establish that driving was an essential function). The
House Judiciary Committee stated: "In the event there are two effective accommodations, the employer
may choose the accommodation that is less expensive or easier for the employer to implement, as long
as the selected accommodation provides meaningful equal employment opportunity for the applicant or
employee." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990). Employers are not required to lower quality or
quantity standards. Moreover, employers are not required to create new jobs, displace other employees,
or promote disabled employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)X5)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 ("The obligation to make
reasonable accommodation is a form of non-discrimination."); see also Karlan & Rutherglen, supra
note 21, at 8, 9 (explaining that the concept of reasonable accommodation is not only "integral to defining the class of protected individuals," but also "constitutes a separate species of discrimination").
49. See, e.g., Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1136 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding
that a wrist rest rather than adjustable keyboard was a reasonable accommodation for employee with
osteoarthritis); Perez v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 677 F. Supp. 357, 359 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that the
employer was required to provide a straight back chair, use of elevator and regular breaks for a receptionist with back problems).
50. The term "reasonable accommodation" may include(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
51. The ADA defines a reasonable accommodation as "ir]odifications or adjustments to the work
environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily
performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that
position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(i)(ii) (2000). The ADA requires an employer who is aware of an
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sonable accommodation compels employers to change the requirements

and working conditions of a job to provide individuals with disabilities an
equal opportunity for participation. Typically, reasonable accommodation

involves "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and

other similar accommodations."'

These accommodations are intended to

mitigate or eliminate any performance impact resulting from the employee's disabilities. Individuals who receive this reasonable accommoda-

tion do not gain an "advantage" over other employees-they are simply
provided the same opportunity to succeed.53 Thus, the ADA protects dis-

abled persons whose physical or mental impairments prevent them from
performing the job in its current form, but who could perform the job if the

employer reconfigured it to some degree. m
Once a disabled employee submits a request for accommodation, the

employer must determine whether the request is reasonable.55 Although
employee's disability to take reasonable measures to accommodate that disability. See Id. §
12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA requires the employer to identify possible accommodations and evaluate the
reasonableness of the accommodation, including any possible negative effects on the employer. See 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (discussing steps an employer would undertake in making a reasonable accommodation).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)2)(i)-(ii) (identifying typical accommodations, including facility modification, job restructuring and "permitting the use of acrued paid leave or
providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment," "p]roviding personal assistants, such as a
page turner for an employee with no hands or a travel attendant to act as a sighted guide to assist a
blind employee on occasional business trips," or "making employer provided transportation accessible,
and providing reserved parking spaces"); EEOC Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment
Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 3.10, at 111-16 to 111-33 (1990) (providing detailed examples of reasonable accommodations). The legislative history reveals that Congress
intended this language to be as illustrative as the "other similar accommodations" formulation would
indicate: "[The list of illustrations] is not meant to be exhaustive;, rather it is intended to provide general guidance about the nature of the obligation.... [The decision as to what reasonable eccommodation is appropriate is one which must be determined based on the particular facts of the individual
case." S.REP.NO. 116,at32(1990).
53. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 4 (drawing distinctions between the ADA's reasonable accommodations rule and traditional forms of non-discrimination protection, but concluding that
the distinctions do not show "that disabled individuals are somehow receiving unwarranted benefit or
even an unfair advantage over other groups that have experienced exclusion from full economic participation"). Courts consistently have interpreted the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement to
include a non-discrimination mandate. ROBERT L BURGDORF, JR., DISABILITY DLscMI
'
IN
EMPLOYmENT LAW 38 (1995). For a discussion of the ADA as requiring affirmative accommodation
rather than simply preventing discrimination, see Michelle T. Friedland, Note, Not Disablcd Enough:
The ADA's "Major Life Activity" Definition of Discrimination,52 STAN. L REV. 171, 173 (1999)
(quoting BLACK's LAW DicTrONARY to define discrimination as "a failure to treat all persons equally
where no rational distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored").
54. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(b)(8), (9), 12112(b)(4), (5) (1994).
55. See id. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act). The Interpretative Regulations are important in explaining how the EEOC construes the substantive regulations and the ADA itself. Although the regulations are not binding on the
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the employer is required to consider each request, the duty to accommodate
is not limitless. The employer does not have to accommodate an employee

who poses a direct threat to others."

In addition, accommodation is not

required if the requested accommodation would pose an "undue hardship"
for the employer. 7 The undue hardship defense protects employers from

being forced to undertake accommodations that may result in a materially
detrimental economic impact on business operations.

8

Although the ADA

treats "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" as distinct concepts,59 courts that find a requested accommodation "reasonable" are un-

likely to exempt employers from undertaking it; and correspondingly,
courts that find a requested accommodation to pose an "undue hardship"

are unlikely to demand that an employer provide it.d

agency or on the courts, they are entitled to some deference. See Christenson v. Harris County, 120 S.
Ct. 1655, 1662 (2000). In this case the guidelines suggest the following step by step process: (I) the
employer in conjunction with the employee must identify and distinguish the essential aspects of the
job; identify the abilities and limitation of the employee as well as barriers to performing the essential
job functions, (2) the employer must identify, again in conjunction with the employee, possible accommodations, (3) the reasonableness of the identified accommodations must be weighed, and (4) the
selected accommodation is implemented. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 Interpretive Guidance.
56. The ADA does not require employers to hire an individual if the applicant poses a direct threat
to the health or safety of others. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). The EEOC regulations expand the definition of direct threat to include threat to one's self. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (defining "direct threat" as "a
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation").
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10) (defining undue hardship as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" and requiring the court to consider factors such as the nature and cost of the accommodation needed and the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision
of the reasonable accommodation). The legislative history makes clear that Congress did not intend to
impose definite rules about what constitutes undue hardship-for instance, percentage of pay for the
position in question. 136 CONG. REC. H2470, H2475 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (rejecting an amendment that would have established a presumption of undue hardship at ten percent of annual salary);
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3,at 41 (1990) (rejecting per se rule of undue hardship).
58. See H.R. REP. Nb. 101-485, pt. 3 at 41; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (2000). The legislative
history indicates that Congress intended to define the term "undue hardship" narrowly, stating that [the
term] refers to an action that is "unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature of the program." H.R. RE. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 67 (1990). The House Report
expressly disavows Title VII's view of undue hardship which permits allowing a cost defense to a
claim ofreligidus accommodation. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (distinguishing duties under the
ADA from those under Title VII as set forth in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977)).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9), (10). Most courts construe the inquiry into whether an accommodation is "reasonable" to be essentially the same as the question of whether it imposes an undue hardship.
See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 11-12. Chai Feldblum, one of the drafters of the ADA,
however, has explained that the determination of"reasonableness" was intended to focus on the effectiveness of an accommodation, while consideration of the costs imposed on the employer would be
taken into account as part of the "undue hardship" test. Chai R. Feldblum, The (R)evolution of Physical
Disability Anti-discrimination Law: 1976-1996, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 613,
619-20 (1996); see Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 144-48 (2d Cir. 1995) (Newman, C.J., concurring) (discussing this view of reasonable accommodation).
60. See. e.g., Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (containing dictum that accommodation is unreasonable if it imposes undue hardship). The distinction between reasonable accommoda-
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Thus, although critics of the ADA have argued that the reasonable accommodation requirement of the statute unfairly requires employers to
"subsidize" employees with disabilities, 6 the costs that would be borne by
employers are substantially limited by the requirement that those accommodations not impose an "undue hardship." In addition, the burdens imposed on employers are akin to other statutory obligations, such as duties
to provide fair and safe workplaces (e.g., the requirements of the Family
Medical Leave Act and Occupational Safety and Health Act).' The ADA,
tion and undue hardship survives mainly in the procedural form of allocating the burden of proof between the disabled individual and the employer. The federal courts of appeals are split over the relationship between the two concepts and the extent of the plaintiff's burden of proof. CompareBorkowski, 63 F.3d at 135-40, 144-48 (explaining allocation of the burden of proof on undue hardship by the
fact that "the employer has far greater access to information than the typical plaintiff, both about its
own organization and, equally importantly, about the practices and structure of the industry as a
whole") and Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (when a federal administrative agency
invokes the affirmative defense of undue hardship, it must bear the burden of persuasion on that issue)
with Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) ('The employee must
show that the accommodation is reasonable. . .") and Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 642 (2d Cir.
1991) ("Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case that she or he is otherwise qualified by showing
the ability to perform the essential functions of the job with some reasonable accommodation, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that no reasonable accommodation is possible.").
61. The claim that the ADA represents an unfunded mandate was made from the time of the adoption ofthe ADA in 1991. Conservative critics of the ADA voice this view with some frequency. For
example, Professor Jerry Mashaw immediately noted that the ADA uses "potentially unfair taxation to
provide in-kind benefits, which a deficit-happy Congress does not want to fund through the budget
process." Jerry L. Mashaw, In Search of the Disabled, In DIsABILnrr' AND WORK INCENIVES,
RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNTIES 70 (Carolyn L Weaver ed., 1991) (hereinafter DISABIUTY AND WORK].
Carolyn Weaver has referred to the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA as a feature
that "distorts a civil rights measure into what is essentially a mandated benefits program for the disabled." Carolyn Weaver, Incentives Versus Controls In FederalDisabilityPolicy, In DISABILITY AND
WORK, supra, 1, 3-17 (arguing for incentives rather than rights-based policies toward disability).
Likewise, Professor Richard Epstein argued,
Under the ADA, Congress mandates a set of off-budget subsidies not explicitly taken into
account in setting federal policy. The expenditures are bome by private businesses and by
state and local governments, which are left to scramble for resources as best they can. By
working through the regulatory made, Congress ensures the fatal separation of the right to
order changes from the duty to pay for them.
RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIscmWmATION
LAw 493 (1992) (concluding that a system of federal grants should replace the ADA so that Congress
pays for the accommodations that it wants employers to make).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A). Empirical evidence suggests that the cost of providing accommodations has not, in fact, been high. See Peter David Blanck, TranscendingTite ofthe Americans
ith DisabilitiesAct: A Case Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., 20 MENTAL & PHYsICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 278, 278 (1996) (noting that the overall average cost of the accommodations made by Sears
was $45); Lisa A. Lavelle, Note, The Duty To Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with DisabilitiesOnly To Disable Small Businesses?, 66 NOTRE
DAME L REV. 1135, 1194 (1991) (arguing that limitations on the duty to provide accommodations will
protect business).
63. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 13, at 377-78 (reporting that the average cost of a reasonable
accommodation was less than $500 with many accommodations costing nothing); Jeny L Mashaw,
Against FirstPrinciples, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211,222 (1994) (claiming that early assumptions that
employing disabled individuals does not generate efficiency gains may be unfounded and that employ-
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like Title VII, acknowledges that an employer's prejudice or ignorance
may predispose him to make economically unsound judgments about certain individuals. Studies have shown that in many instances the economic
productivity of employees with disabilities will offset the costs of providing accommodations to those workers.6
B. The Difference Between Title VII and theADA: The Causes and Definition ofDiscriminationAgainst Individualswith Disabilities
Courts have adopted some of Title VII's precedent in deciding ADA
cases due to practical and perceived similarities between the statutes. 65 The
ADA shares the same goal: helping to provide a protected class with equal
opportunity for employment.s The legislative history of the ADA contains
multiple references to the success achieved by Title VII.67 The legislative
ers who have hired such individuals often report economic gains from their efforts to reconceptualizo
jobs and tasks in a way that enables disabled individuals to perform); J.HoULTE VERKERKE, AN ECo.
NOMIC DEFENSE OF DISABILrTY DISCRIMINATION LAW 24, (University of Virginia School of Law,
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 99-14, 1999), available at http://papers.ssm.com (arguing that the
social benefits of ADA-required accommodations outweigh the private costs to an individual employer
in two ways (1) by avoiding the costs of dependency and (2) by protecting against inefficient labormarket churning of people with hidden disabilities).
64. Disabled employees, in fact, have proven to be good employees. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at
28-29 (1990) (citing a study of 1452 physically impaired employees at E.1. du Pont do Nemours and
Company finding that "the disabled worker performed as well as or better than their non-disabled coworkers," with ninety-one percent of disabled workers rated average or better in performance, ninetythree percent rated average or better for turnover rate, seventy-nine percent rated average or better in
attendance, and more than fifty percent rated above average in safety); EEOC Technical Assistance
Manual, supranote 52, § 3.2, at 111-2 (explaining the enabling role played by reasonable accommodations); see also 136 CONG. REC. 11,460 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens) (citing the du Pont study as
"the first of many to show that disabled employees ... have equal or better attendance, performance,
and safety records than average"); 136 CONG. REc. 10,874 (1990) (statement ofRep. Kleczka) (stating
that employers report that workers with disabilities "usually work harder and longer than able-bodied
counterparts").
65. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1984) with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §
703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994) (prohibiting an employer from "limit[ing], scgregat[ing],
or classify[ing] his employees ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin").
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX8) (1994) (listing "equality of opportunity" as one of the ADA's
goals); id. § 12101(a)(9) (stating that the ADA's goal is to combat discrimination that "denies people
with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis"); id. § 2000e-2 (equal employment
opportunity underlies Title VII); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 background (1994) (stating that the ADA's
purpose is to allow the disabled "to receive equal opportunities to compete"); Karlan & Rutherglen,
supranote 21, at 25 (describing "equal opportunity" as "the fundamental goal of the ADA" and analyzing the appropriate conception of that phrase); George Rutherglen, Abolition In a Different Voice, 78
VA. L. REV. 1463, 1465 (1992) (noting that employment discrimination laws were "designed to open
jobs to groups excluded from them") (book review).
67. See, e.g., The ADA Conference Report, 136 CONG. REc. 17,378 (1990) (statement of Senator
Kennedy). Senator Ted Kennedy stated:
In the 1960s, Martin Luther King, Jr. spoke of a time when people would be judged by the
content of their character and not the color of their skin. The Americans with Disabilities
Act ensures that millions of men, women and children can look forward to a day when they
will be judged by the strength of their abilities and not misconceptions about their disabili-
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findings section of the preamble to the ADA identifies individuals with
disabilities as a "'discrete and insular minority' who have been faced with
restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society."e Persons with disabilities face obstacles similar to those seen in
race and
gender discrimination, such as inaccurate assumptions and stereo69
types.

Because of these perceived similarities in the nature of the discrimination experienced by Title VII's protected classes and the disabled, Con-

gress borrowed substantially from Title VII's list of prohibited behaviors in
' Indeed, all but one of
drafting the ADA's definition of "discriminate." 70
ties
....
But this journey has not been easy or quick. It was only in the past 2 yearzs,
as the
Nation approached the 25th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-that it became
clear that the time has finally come to address the unfinished business of civil rights for
those with disabilities.
Id. (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Bob Dole commented:
L]ast month, we celebrated the 25th anniversary ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Passage of the Civil Rights Act was one of Congress'-and America's--shining moments.
And it was one of the great milestones in American's long journey toward civil rights justice. So I am pleased today to join with President Bush in endorsing the Americans with
Disabilities Act--the next major step in the civil rights struggle-and a bill that will finally
expand civil rights protections for people with disabilities.
135 CONG. REc. 18,879 (1989) (statement ofSen. Dole).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). The statute states:
Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on chartcteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.
Id.
69. Some psychologists have attempted to categorize the most common stereotypes nondisabled
persons assign to people with disabilities. These stereotypes include: "(a) the Subhuman Organism, (b)
the Menace, (c)
the Unspeakable Object of Dread, (c) [sic] the Object of Pity, (Cd)
the Holy Innocent, (e)
the Diseased Organism, (f)
the Object of Ridicule, and (g) the Eternal Child." SPEcTRUM, supra note
5,at 25 (quoting WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE PRINCIPLE OF NcRMAZ=TION INHuNAN SERVICE 1624 (1972)). Such inaccurate assumptions make it difficult for nondisabled people to see the individual
through the disability and recognize their full potential to work. Id.
at 93. In this way, discrimination
against persons with disabilities is similar to discrimination against people of color or women. For
discussions ofresponses to individuals with disabilities, see SHAPIRO, supranote 2, at 30-40 (cbzerving
depictions of people with disabilities in contemporary culture); Myron G.Eisenberg, Dablity as
Stigma, h DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND-CLAss CMZENS 3, 6-7 (Myron G.Eisenberg et al. eds.,
1982) (describing a common perception ofpeople with disabilities as being "not quite human").
70. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 5-6 nn.18-21 (explaining in detail the parallel discrimination provisions in the ADA and Title VII). Although individuals with disabilities have long
faced discrimination in the workplace, they never received protection under Title VII. During the late
1970s and early 1980s, proposals existed to bring discrimination on the basis of disability under the
umbrella of Title VII. See, eg., H.R. 1200, 98th Cong., 129 CONG. REC. H289-90 (daily ed. Feb. 2,
1978); S.REP. No. 316, at 1 (1979). These proposals were ultimately rejected, however, in favor of an
approach that addresses the unique difficulties faced by individuals with disabilities. Thus, before
1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the only statutory protection for the disabled. See RICHARD
K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD VILL TO CIVIL RIOTns (1984) (chronicling the history of the Rehabilitation
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the ADA's list of prohibited actions are also seen in Title VII.' Finally,
the language of Title VIIP is the source of the powers, remedies and procedures to
be used in employment discrimination cases brought under the
n
ADA.
Despite these similarities, Congress recognized that discrimination
against persons with disabilities has a cause distinct from discrimination
against other protected classes. Frequently, discrimination against people
of color and women is deliberate and based on stereotypes or even malevolence.' Discrimination against individuals with disabilities, however, is
often unintentional.' For example, when the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) provided only written exams for promotions to upper-level positions within the company, they discriminated against those employees who
were dyslexic or had other learning disabilities.76 TVA did not create its
Act of 1973); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 427-28 (1991).
71. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the limited reasonable
accommodation duty found under the religious discrimination provision of Title VII, see Id.
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
73. See id. §§ 12101, 12117(a). The regulations for enforcement of the ADA arc found in 29
C.F.R. § 1630 (2000). For a discussion comparing the procedural aspects of bringing suit under ADA
with those under Title VII, see Lianne C. Kynch, Note, Assessing the Application ofMcDonnell Douglas to Employment Discrimination Claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 MINN,
L. REv. 1515 (1995). Title VII enforcement of employment discrimination claims under the ADA falls
under the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
74. See Judith Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CoR.
NELL L. REV. 401, 429 (1984). Wegner argues that malevolence motivates people to deny people of
color equal opportunity, while ill will does not motivate people to deny persons with disabilities equal
opportunity. Id. Instead, society denies disabled individuals equal opportunity by failing to consider
how policies might affect them or by feeling awkward around persons with disabilities. Id. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), "Congress acknowledged that
society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." Id. at 284. Indeed, according to the House
Repor,
the social consequences that have attached to being disabled often bear no relationship to the
physical or mental limitations imposed by the disability. For example, being paralyzed has
meant far more than being unable to walk[-]it has meant being excluded from public
schools, being denied employment opportunities, and being deemed an "unfit parent."
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 41 (1990) (quoting Arlene Mayerson of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund).
75. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985) (discussing society's neglect of persons
with disabilities); see, e.g., Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Clo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir.
1981) (discussing evil intent). According to the Tenth Circuit:
It would be a rare case indeed in which a hostile discriminatory purpose or subjective intent
to discriminate solely on the basis of handicap could be shown. Discrimination on the basis
of handicap usually results from more invidious causative elements and often occurs under
the guise of extending a helping hand or a mistaken, restrictive belief as to the limitations of
handicapped persons.
Id.
76. See Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (1Ith Cir. 1983) (holding that employer's failure to offer
an oral exam violated the Rehabilitation Act).
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exam with the purpose of excluding disabled employees, but failed to be

sensitive to the fact that some employees had learning disabilities. Thus,
benign neglect or ignorance of the skills and needs of persons with disabili-

ties is a primary cause of discrimination against the disabled.
In passing Title VII, Congress stated that race, sex, religion, and na-

tional origin were usually unrelated to an individual's ability to perform a
job.' Under Title VII's definition of discrimination, employers cannot be
motivated by race or gender when they make employment decisions.7 In

contrast, the ADA recognizes that disability is frequently a legitimate consideration in employment decisions.7 9 The ADA's definition of discrimina-

tion allows employers to consider an individual's disability when making
employment decisions."0 The ADA would not, of course, require a bus

company to hire a blind driver. Instead, the ADA prohibits an employer
from relying on stereotypes that a disability makes a person unqualified for
a job."1 For example, a bus company generally may not refuse to hire a
deaf bus driver. Deafness does not necessarily prevent an individual from
driving a bus,'a nor does it pose a threat to passenger safety.' Recognizing

that disabilities are unique for each person, the ADA permits employers to
77. See Wegner, supra note 74, at 441-42. Wegner argues that disability dhcrimination differs
from race discrimination because, while race is irrelevant to ability, disability is not. Se Id. at 442. As
a result, a finely tuned inquiry is necessary to develop an anti-discrimination scheme directed at eliminating discrimination against persons with disabilities. Id.
78. Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to clearly state that any consideration of these protected
traits is illegal. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). The act
now contains a provision that states, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... an unlawful employm-nt
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, =x, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other fctors also
motivated the practice." Id. Tide VII allows employers to defend discrimination claims based on
classifications of sex, religion, or national origin if the employer can prove that such a classification is
"a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise." Id. § 2000e-2(e). As implied by the language of Title VII, ra will never be
considered a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ").
79. See Wegner, supranote 74, at 433 n.95 (arguing that the lack of non-intentional discrimination
case law under the Rehabilitation Act may reflect the fact that defendants oflen readily cdmit that the
individual's handicap gives grounds for exclusion or other discriminatory conduct, thus clearly evidencing intent).
80. The ADA prevents employers from discriminating against a "qualified individual %Atha disability." See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text (explaining the ADA's definition of these
terms).
81. Additionally, an employer must assess whether alternative methods exist to do the job such that
a disabled employee could perform these duties. See Supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (describing the duty to reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities). The entire process of reasonable accommodation requires that an employer recognize a disability and treat that pasoin differently
because of her disability.
82. See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209,211 (th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district's decision that a deaf bus driver had been discriminated against in violation of the
ADA).
83. Id. at 214 (finding that the deaf bus driver did not pos a direct threat to safety and posssed all
skills and abilities necessary to ensure passenger safety).
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consider the specific nature of a person's disability in making employment
decisions.
Professors Karlan and Rutherglen have noted that the ADA embraces
both a "sameness" and a "difference" model of discrimination." Under the
sameness model, discrimination occurs when individuals who are fundamentally the same are treated differently for illegitimate reasons. In the
context of disabilities, the sameness model would condemn decisions made
on the basis of stereotypes that assume that individuals with physical or
mental impairments are not equally capable of doing a particular job.3 In
contrast, a difference model requires employers to take the relevant trait
into account, rather than ignoring it, to eliminate its impact on employment
opportunity. 6 In this way, a difference model of non-discrimination recognizes that "in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently.""7
Because of the unique nature of disability discrimination, Congress defined discrimination against the disabled differently than discrimination
against other minorities.8 8 This is the primary reason that the ADA's definition of discrimination includes the requirement of reasonable accommodation; employers may be required to alter certain characteristics of the job
84. For a brief and lucid description of sameness and difference models, see Daniel R. Ortiz, Feminisms and the Family, 18 HARe. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523,524-25 (1995). The ADA does not rely solely
on this different treatment conception ofequality. In situations in which a disability does not impact an
individual's ability to perform the job in question, the ADA's prohibition on discrimination requires
that people with disabilities be treated the same as others. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
85. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 422
(2000) (noting that non-disabled individuals often overstate the limiting effects of and safety risks
attendant to disabled individuals' impairments).
86. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 14; see also E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said,
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the "Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 81-82 (1997) (noting that applying the allegedly "neutral" reasonable
person standard subordinates sexual minorities who do not conform to the majority's norms); R.
George Wright, Persons with Disabilities and the Meaning of Constitutional Equal Protection, 60
OHIO ST. L. J. 145, 162-73 (1999) (arguing that equality for people with severe disabilities requires
treatment that takes these disabilities into account).
87. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990) ("This reasonable accommodation requirement
is central to the non-discrimination mandate of the ADA."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31 (1989) (describing the accommodations duty as "a form of non-discrimination"); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1999)
("The obligation to make reasonable accommodation is a form of non-discrimination."); Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 10 (citing Bakke to describe the difference model of non-discrimination);
Colette G. Matzzie, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. LJ. 193, 211-12 (1993) ("The ADA requires that employers reasonably accommodate their disabled employees as part of its non-discrimination scheme,
rather than merely mandating equal treatment or viewing accommodation to be affirmative action,").
88. See Miller, supra note 24, at 514 (noting that "the traditional civil rights model of treating
people 'exactly the same' does not apply to disability discrimination"); E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive
Function ofSuccession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARmZ. L. REV. 1063, 1064
(1999) (noting that at least in some circumstances, treating individuals equally means requiring different treatment).
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in response to an individual's disability. $'Failure to provide this reason-

able accommodation constitutes unlawful employment discrimination. o

The first effect of the reasonable accommodation mandate is to force
employers to recognize subtle ways in which the workplace is biased

against the disabled." Because employers are often not consciously aware
of their own biases with respect to disability, a statute that simply prohibits
intentional discrimination would likely have little effect on their conduct.'
The reasonable accommodation requirement helps employers focus on this
unintentional discrimination93 and whether an employee with a disability

can be enabled to perform the essential elements of the job. An employer
may realize that the person would in fact be able to perform the job after

certain adjustments are made.

If, however, an employer is unwilling to

89. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1994 & Supp. IMI1997) (defining discrimination to include the failure to
make reasonable accommodations); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)-(b) (1999); see Vande Zande v. Vi& Dep't
of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that employment decisions based an "a
vocationally relevant disability" are not analogous to other forms of employment discrimination, but
are nevertheless protected under the ADA's expanded definition of "discrimination"); Karlan &
Rutherglen, supranote 21, at 8-9 (explaining that the concept of reasonable accommodation is not only
"integral to defining the class of protected individuals" but also that failure to make reasonable accommodations "constitutes a separate species of discrimination").
91. See HR. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990) C([Tlhe reasonable accommodation requirement
is best understood as a process in which barriers to a particular individual's equal employment opportunity are removed."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 (1989) (same).
92. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (noting that discrimination against the
handicapped is "most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and
indifference).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989) (explaining that disability discrimination "includes harms resulting from the construction of... architectural[ and communication barriers and the adoption or application of standards and criteria and practices and procedures
based on thoughtlessness or indifference-of benign neglect"); 136 CO.rO. REc. 19,800 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) (asserting that "it is not disability which limits one's ability to participate in life, but
it is societal barriers"); 135 CONG. REc. 19,800 (1989) (statement of Sen. Haicin) (asserting that it is
often not the disability that is limiting, but "the obstacles placed in the way by an indifferent society").
94. Some commentators have described the discrimination fated by disabled individuals as "structural discrimination" or "dynamic discrimination" which occurs when physical structures and social
practices that are designed for a single group effectively exclude the member of another group. See
David Wasserman, DistributiveJustice, in DISABIUTY, DIFMEICE, DtscItInUATO4: PMnPECTIVES
ONJi
mrT
EINBIOEIouCs Amf PUBLIC POUCY 147, 176-79 (1998); see also HR. REP. NO. 101-485, pt.
2, -pt 29 (1990) (describing structural forms of discrimination); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989)
(same); HR. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29 (describing dynamic forms of discrimination that result
from "the adoption or application of standards, criteria, practices, or procedures that am based on
thoughtlessness or indifferenco--that discrimination resulting from benign neglect"); S. REP. No. 101116, at 6 (describing discrimination as including "harms resulting from the construction of transortation, architectural, and communication barriers and the adoption or application of standards and criteria
and practices and procedures based on thoughtlessness or indifference-of benign neglect);, Mark
Kelman, Concepts ofDiscriminationin "GeneralAbllry"Job Testing, 104 HARV. L REV. 1157, 116061, 1170-83 (1991) (describing forms of dynamic discrimination in general-ability job tests). Because
of the structural discrimination faced by those with disabilities, a simple non-discrimination mandate is
insufficient to achieve equal employment opportunity for some disabled individuals.
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make such adjustments, it is appropriate to treat the employer as biased."'
A second, and more important effect of the reasonable accommodation
requirement is that it forces employers to recognize that workplaces are not
structured neutrally-they are shaped by and for a non-disabled majority. 6
Employers that do not accommodate the needs of people with disabilities
unwittingly give a competitive edge to individuals who are not disabled.'
Again, the reasonable accommodation requirement is not a means of giving
people with disabilities a special benefit or advantage; rather, it is a means
of leveling the playing field so that people with disabilities can compete on
an equal basis." Once this "leveling" is assured through reasonable ac95. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 943.44
(1993) (viewing the reasonable accommodation requirement as a prohibition on discrimination through
negligence). The ADA does, however, require the provision of reasonable accommodations even when
the employer has a legitimate business reason for not wanting to do so, as long as they do not impose
an undue burden on the employer. Because a person with a disability differs from the physical or
mental norm, people often make a value judgment that the difference is significant and very negative.
"Far from being a response to an inflexible fact about biology, our perception of a handicap nearly
always reflects an arbitrary, unconscious decision to treat normal social function and the possession of
any handicap as mutually exclusive attributes." SPECTRum, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting JOHN GLIEDMAN & WILLIAM ROTH, THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN INAMERICA 24, 30

(1980)).
96. See FRANK G. BowE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA: BARRIERS TO DISABLED PEOPLE viii, (1978)
(explaining that "[flor two hundred years, we have designed a nation for the average, normal, able.
bodied majority, little realizing that millions cannot enter many of our buildings, ride our subways and
buses, enjoy our educational and recreational programs and facilities, and use our communication
systems."); Chai R. Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirements of the ADA, in IMPLEMENTING Ti
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 35, 36-37
(Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993); see also Burgdorf, supra note 18, at 533 (describing the reasonable accommodation requirement as "a method for eliminating discrimination that inheres
in the planning and organization of societal opportunities based on expectations of certain physical and
mental characteristics"); Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled,
74 GEo. LJ. 1435, 1438 (1986). Rebell argues that unlike other protected classes, persons with dis.
abilities do not share common physical, psychological, or cultural characteristics. Rather,
"the handicapped" include persons from all racial, sexual, age, and class categories, who
exhibit disabilities as diverse as blindness, cerebral palsy, and emotional disturbances.
Within each disability category is a wide diversity of conditions and needs. These range, for
example, from the severely mentally retarded to the mildly learning disabled and from
wheelchair-bound paraplegics to clubfoot sufferers with mild mobility impairments.
Id.
97. Cf.Rosalie K. Murphy, Note, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment Discrimination
Under Title I ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 S.CAL. L. REV. 1607, 1613 (arguing society
often constructs limitations on a disabled person's ability to work). "Jobs and buildings are designed
around the norm of average, able-bodied adults, to the detriment of those who do not fit this description." Id.; see also Spitko, supra note 88, at 1064 (arguing that the social construction of society always privileges the dominant cultural group).
98. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.1(a) (explaining that the ADA "requires that individuals with dis.
abilities be given the same consideration for employment that individuals without disabilities are
given"); see also Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987) (describing an employer's duty
under section 504 not as affirmative action, but as "an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable
accommodation for a handicapped employee"); Karlan and Rutherglen, supra note 21 (stating that the
fact that reasonable accommodation does not require employers to modify qualification standards or to
give preference to the protected class is an important distinction between affirmative action and reason.
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commodations, the disabled must meet the same employment standards as
all other employees."
The ADA stipulates that employers who fail to reasonably accommodate existing or potentially disabled employees can be found liable for discrimination.l"c This is a far different definition of "discrimination" than

that embraced under Title VII. Title VII proscribes differential treatment
of employees for any reason."' In fact, the Supreme Court has rejected the
notion that Title VII requires employers to treat workers differently or
more favorably because they are a member of a protected class."a Title
VII does not require the employer to take any steps to revamp the workplace environment It defines discrimination in a negative sense: employment practices are unlawful only if they prevent individuals from doing the
job as the employer defines it.

3

Accommodations were viewed as unnec-

able accommodation); Travis, supranote 23, at 901 (same). The distinction between affirmative action
and reasonable accommodation uniformly is not recognized by either courts or commentators, however.
See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999) (Although the dissent would
prefer to view the reasonable accommodation of reassignment as 'affirmative action,' Congress chose
to consider it otherwise when it defined the failure reasonably to accommodate (including reassignment) as a prohibited act of discrimination. It is the Congressional definition, of course, that must
govern our analysis"); Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982) (C[U]seof the phrase
'affirmative action' in this context is unfortunate, making it difficult to talk about any kind of altmative efforts without importing the special legal and social connotations of that term."); Americans With
Disabilities Act, 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 42-44 (1989) (statement of Lawrence
Z. Lorber) (arguing that reasonable accommodation requires more than non-discrimination and
amounts to affirmative action). But see S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26-27 (1989) ("(T]he employer has no
obligation under this legislation to prefer applicants with disabilities over other applicants on the basis

of disability."); 136 CONG. REC. 10,868 (1990) (statement of Rep. Edw-ards) (stating that the ADA does
not "require employers to give preference to persons with disabilities").
99. See 136 CONG. REC. 10,856 (1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) C[The ADA] does not guarantee
a job-or anything else. It guarantees a level playing field"); Bruce A. Miller, The Americans Wth
DisabilitiesAct and the Unionized Workplace, 74 Mtict. BJ. 1180, 1180 (1995) ("[The] ADA requires
that disabled individuals, otherwise qualified for a job, be allowed to compete on a level playing field
by means of reasonable accommodation provided by their employers."); sce also Locke, supranote 18,

at 107 ("The ADA was not conceived as an affimnative action statute, but rather as one of equal opportunity." (footnote omitted)).
100. See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
101. See Peter J. Rubin, EqualRights, Special Rights, and the NatureofAntldlscrimlnaton Law, 97
MiCm. L. REv. 564, 564-68 (1998) (discussing the ability of the law to provide equal treatment).
102. E.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977) (stating Title VII does not
require differential or preferential treatment of people because of their protected traits).
103. Of course, the use of selection criteria that disproportionately exclude members of a protected
class is actionable. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (1994 & Supp. IlI 1997); ice also UAW. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199, 208 (1991) (determining the employer's policy of barring all fertile
women from jobs involving lead exposure exceeding OSHA standards was forbidden under Title VII.
But an underlying assumption of the disparate impact case law is that it is the selection procedures,
rather than the elements of the job itself as currently configured, that have caused the disparate impart.
Thus, courts have focused on the tightness of the fit between the challenged employment practice and
the job itself, rather than on the nature of the job, in considering whether the challenged practice is
sufficiently job related to permit the disparate impact.
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essary to equalize opportunity for members of Title VII's protected categories, who were expected to compete in the workplace once employers were
prohibited from acting on stereotypical assumptions, mistaken perceptions,
and erroneous beliefs." 4
Although much of the language of the ADA is superficially similar to
that of Title VII, the similarities mask a conceptual shift in the meaning of
discrimination and the methods used to remedy it. If courts are to apply

the ADA in a manner consistent with Congress' intent, they must appreciate the difference between other forms of discrimination and discrimination
on the basis of disability, as well as the different means that Congress has
chosen to address the latter." 5 Unfortunately, the courts have seized on the
ADA's superficial similarity to Title VII and have applied Title VII precedent, thereby erecting a formidable barrier to disabled plaintiffs in ADA
cases.
III. PROBLEMS WITH APPLICATION OF TITLE VII PRECEDENT TO THE ADA

A great deal of scholarly energy has been devoted to pointing out the
shortcomings of the ADA and the federal courts' interpretations of its provisions. Surprisingly, however, contemporary scholarship about the ADA
has not heavily criticized the courts' reliance on Title VII precedent. Because Title VII does not include the same duty of reasonable accommodation as the ADA, its precedent is often of limited value. This section exam-

ines three areas in which borrowing from Title VII has been detrimental to
ADA plaintiffs. First, courts have applied Title VII's reasonable accom-

modation precedent to ADA claims. Title VII's reasonable accommodation provision is extremely limited, and thus its application to the ADA
necessarily restricts a disabled employee's ability to obtain any accommodation.

Second, courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-

104. This Article does not argue that Title VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and other employment discrimination laws were correct in their assumption
that equal employment opportunity may be achieved without reasonable accommodations in the conventional workplace. History has shown that more may be required if equal opportunity is to be
achieved. For a persuasive discussion of the potential benefits of extending the reasonable accommodations concept to anti-discrimination and civil rights laws more generally, see Deborah A. Calloway,
Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1, 25-49 (1995) (analyzing how
current laws might be used to support accommodations for pregnant women); Karlan & Rutherglen,
supra note 21, at 2-5, 38-41; Sandra R. Levitsky, Reasonably Accommodating Race: Lessonsfrom the
ADA for Race-TargetedAffirmative Action, 18 LAW & INEQ. 85 (2000); Joan C. Williams, Restructuring Work and Family Entitlements Around Family Values, 19 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 753, 755-56
(1996) (noting that an employer is not required to develop flexible work hours even though a rigid
work schedule may disproportionately eliminate female workers who have child-care responsibilities).
105. See W. Robert Gray, The Essential-FunctionsLimitation on the Civil Rights of People with
Disabilitiesand John Rawls's Concept of SocialJustice, 22 N.M. L. REV. 295, 351 (1992) (noting that
only in disability discrimination does the protected trait pertain to normal job performance) see also
Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy Justice and Disability,47 UCLA L REV. 599 (2000).
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shifting test for proving disparate treatment under Title VII to ADA reasonable accommodation claims. This test does not work with ADA claims
because it does not place the burden on the employer to prove that a requested accommodation would cause undue hardship. Requiring the plaintiff to bear this burden significantly undermines a disabled plaintiff's
chance of success. Finally, under the current constructive discharge test
applied in some circuits, an employee who resigns due to discriminatory
treatment must not only prove that the work environment was intolerable,
but also that the employer intended for the employee to resign. Considering much of the discrimination against disabled individuals is nonintentional and results from insensitivity on the part of the employer, intent
is usually difficult to demonstrate.
All of this statutory borrowing occurs without much discussion or explanation on the part of the courts as to when such borrowing is appropriate. As some courts do not even acknowledge that they are borrowing
from Title VII, they may be assuming that employment discrimination
statutes are all the same. Because no standard exists for when borrowing
from Title VII should take place, splits in the circuits have occurred in the
three areas mentioned here and are discussed more fully below. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to provide any clear guidance on these
interpretative issues.
Examining this faulty borrowing from Title VII through the prism of
concrete examples can help identify the particular shortcomings of the process and suggest a solution. The next section will propose a revised
framework for making ADA reasonable accommodation determinations
that might overcome, or at least reduce, the shortcomings associated with
the indiscriminate and mechanical borrowing of concepts developed in
Title VII case law.
A. Reasonable Accommodation Under Title VII andADA
As noted above, one of the most important protections provided by the
ADA is the duty imposed on employers to "reasonably accommodate" the
known physical and/or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified disabled employee." Congress adopted the term "reasonable accommodation" from Title ViI's religious accommodation provision.
Title VII provides that an employer must offer a reasonable accommodation only to those individuals whose religious beliefs create a conflict
with the employer's legitimate expectations, unless doing so would impose
an undue hardship on the employer."7 Because a legal regime that compels accommodation of religious practices raises First Amendment prob106. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994); see supranotes 42-54 and accompanying text.
107. See 42 US.C. § 2000e0"). The text setting forth these requirements in Title VI is similar to the
parallel text in the ADA. See i § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII's requirement of rea-

sonable accommodation of religious practices narrowly, stating that anything more than a de minimis cost would impose an undue hardship on

employers."°

By contrast, there is no constitutional principle that restricts govern-

ment benefits for the disabled."' Congress unambiguously intended for the
duty of reasonable accommodation to receive a broader interpretation, and
the exemption for undue hardship to receive a correspondingly narrower

interpretation, when it enacted the ADA."' Congress specifically stated
that the two reasonable accommodation provisions were not the same, and

that the ADA's reasonable accommodation should not be interpreted in the
same manner as Title VII. "2 Despite this, some courts have refused to
look at reasonable accommodation afresh and have defaulted to Title VII
reasonable accommodation case law to interpret the ADA standard." The

conflict between reasonable accommodations and seniority rights of union
members represents one area in which this borrowing from Title VII's reasonable accommodation case law has occurred. Under the National Labor

Relations Act (NLRA)," 4 when a binding collective bargaining agreement" is in existence, an employer may not, without obtaining union con-

108. This is particularly true if nonreligious commitments did not entail similar obligations. See,
e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Calder, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 n.9 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that imposed an absolute duty on employers to allow workers to observe their Sabbath
and stating that the law gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to designate off a weekend day while
other employees who have strong and legitimate, but nonreligious, reasons for wanting a weekend day
off have no rights under the statute).
109. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,84 (1977).
110. See City of Clebume v. Clebune Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,446 (1985).
111. See42U.S.C.§ 12111(8).
112. Congress specifically rejected the Title VII definition of reasonable accommodation under the
ADA. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 36 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990). Compare42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (setting forth Title VII definition of reasonable accommodation).
113. See, e-g., Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Title
VII case law while noting that the legislative history of the ADA rejects the Hardison standard). Indeed, one court has stated, in dicta, that the standard for reasonable accommodation under Title VII and
the ADA are identical. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170
F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 1999) ("It is true that the ADA requires employers to make 'reasonable accommodations' for individuals with disabilities. However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes an identical obligation on employers with respect to accommodating religion.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 56 (1999). But see Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 896 n.14 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (finding that Hardison was not relevant to the disposition of the ADA claim at issue).
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994). See generally Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor'sDivided
Ranks". Privilegeand the UnitedFrontIdeology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1542-45 (1999) (discuss.
ing the failure of unions to represent views of minorities and women).
115. Collective bargaining was first recognized in the National Labor Relations Act of 1933. See 29
U.S.C. § 159. Collective bargaining permits employees to use their combined power in decisions made
jointly with management to determine the rights, duties, and obligations of both parties. See ARCiiI.
BALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAw § 2.1 (10th ed. 1986). Further, collective bargaining is an ongoing
process of negotiation and interpretation of employment terms and conditions intended to reduce labor
unrest and prevent interference with the flow of commerce. Id. at §§ 2.1-2.2.
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sent, materially or substantially alter any terms of employment contained in
the agreement." 6 Many collectively bargained agreements contain seniority rights," 7 which constitute a term of employment that may not be altered
by the employer absent the consent of the union. A conflict may arise
when a disabled employee requests an accommodation, such as reassignment s to a position with better hours or lighter workloads (usually reserved for those with greater seniority), that violates the seniority rights of
fellow employees under a collective bargaining agreement.

Courts have sought to resolve the issue of whether the ADA requires
reassignment of a disabled employee in violation of a collectively bar-

gained seniority system through an analysis of the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement.

9

As the language of the ADA does not spe-

cifically address collective bargaining agreements and their effect on an
employer's obligation to accommodate," ° a majority of courts have relied
on prior cases concerning reasonable accommodation duties under Title
VII and the Rehabilitation Act. In the area of reassignment accommodation proposals, both statutes have been strictly construed to impose no such
obligation on employers.' As a result of the application of a very narrow
version of reasonable accommodation, disabled union employees have
found it impossible to receive reasonable accommodations when a valid
116. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see also Jerry M. Hunter, Potential Conflicts Between Obligations
Imposed on Employers and Unions By the NationalLabor Relations Act and the Americans with DlISabilitiesAct, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 207,214 n.33 (1993) (stating that if a proposed accommodation was
the only reasonable accommodation available, the ADA might require the employer to reassign the
employee even in the face of conflicting provisions ofa collective bargaining agreement).
117. Under such systems, employees accrue seniority status based on their length of employment.
This status is used to determine the distribution of benefits in the workplace. Seniority system provisions can be one of the most important provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. Robert W.
Pritchard, Avoiding the Inevitable: Resolving Conflicts Between the ADA and the NLRA, 11 LAB. LAW.
375, 389 (1996). In addition to these changes, the ADA began an era of new challenges for labor and
management as both parties adjusted to the legislative demands and ramifications of the Act. See
Benjamin A. Kemer, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: New Challengesfor Labor and
Management, 1991 DET. C. L REv. 891, 892 (1991) (Chighlight[ing] for representatives of labor and
management the areas in which collective bargaining may be used to make a positive contribution in
shaping the federal law which will impinge... on their collective bargaining contracts").
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(9)(B) (including reassignment to a vacant position within the meaning
of reasonable accommodation).
119. See eg., Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F3d 876, 892-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Ecldes v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Stephen F. Befort & Holly Liadquist Thomans
The ADA in Turmoil: JudicialDissonance the Supreme Court'sResponse, and the FutureofDisability
DiscriminationLaw, 78 OR. L REV. 27, 55.61 (1999) (discussing the split in the circuits concerning
the employer's duty to reassign an employee to a vacant position).
120. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12117 (1994). See also Kymberly D. Hankinson, Navigating
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: An Employer's Obligation to Reasonably Accommodate the Dis.
abled in the Unionized Workplace, 15 3. CoNTmP. HEALTH L & POL'Y 245, 255-56 (1998) (noting
that the General Counsel of the NLRB addressed but did not resolve this issue in a published 1992
memorandum and that the EEOC published a technical assistance manual on ADA compliance without
coming to a resolution on the issue).
121. SeeEck/es,94F.3dat 1047-48.
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collective bargaining agreement exists."
The most comprehensive discussion of this cross-statute analogizing
occurs in Eckles v. ConsolidatedRail Corp." In Eckles, the Seventh Circuit held that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement. 4 The plaintiff, a union member who worked as a
yardmaster in a rail yard, was diagnosed with epilepsy. On the advice of
his doctor, Eckles sought an accommodation for his disability through reassignment to a groundwork day shift." Although the union agreed initially to transfer Eckles to a new job,'26 it later changed its position, and
Eckles was "bumped" by a more senior employee.' 27 Eventually Eckles
obtained another position, but because of the continued possibility that he
would be bumped yet again,' he sued both his employer and the union
under the ADA, alleging that they committed employment discrimination
by refusing to reasonably accommodate his disability.'29
On appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the employer and the union, 3 ° the Seventh Circuit held that the ADA did
not require the employer to violate collectively bargained seniority rights,
and upheld the lower court's judgment.'3 ' Therefore, any accommodation
122. See, e.g., id.
at 1051-52; Boersig v. Union Elec. Co., 219 F.3d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 2000); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3d Cir.
1997); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc. 53
F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995). See generally Condon A. McGlothlen & Gary N. Savine, Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.: Reconciling the ADA with Collective Bargaining Agreements: Is This the Correct
Approach?, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 1043 (1997) (discussing and critiquing the majority of courts' approach to the ADA and seniority provisions in collective bargaining agreements).
123. 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996).
124. Id. at 1051-52.
125. Id. at 1043.44. Eckles' doctor advised him not to work the night shift because his condition
required that he maintain a consistent sleep schedule and recommended that he not work at heights
because of the possibility of suffering a seizure and falling. Id. at 1043. Eckles informed his employer
that he wished to invoke Rule 2-H-I of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1044 n.2 (providing
the full text of Rule 2-H-I). Rule 2-H-i in the collective bargaining agreement permitted disabled
employees, on agreement by both Conrail and the UTU, to "bump" more senior employees to obtain a
position meeting the disabled employee's recent restrictions. Id. at 1044.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Specifically, Eckles claimed that exercise of Rule 2-H-I would have been a reasonable
accommodation because it would have provided him protection from being bumped by a more senior
employee. See id. at 1045. Eckles argued that the employer's obligations under the ADA trumped the
employer's obligations under its collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 1045. The employer,
joined by the union, presented the argument that the ADA did not require an infringement on seniority
rights of other employees to accommodate the disability of one. Id.
130. Id. at 1043. The district court granted the employer summary judgment, holding that the ADA
did not require the employer to violate the terms of the collective bargaining agreement ('CBA") to
make an accommodation. Id. Therefore, the accommodation was not reasonable. See Id.
131. Id. at 1051-52. Because neither defendant argued that the proposed accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on its "business," the court narrowed the issue before it to whether the ADA
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that violated the terms of a seniority provision was per se unreasonable."'
The Seventh Circuit, after a dismissive review of the ADA's text and legislative history of the ADA, based its decision primarily on case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act' and Title VIL.'
The Eckles court looked first to the text of the ADA to determine
whether the plaintiff's request for reassignment was reasonable in light of
the collectively bargained seniority rights. Although the court noted that
the ADA expressly defines "reasonable accommodation" to include 'reassignment to a vacant position,""' it asserted that this language weakened
Eckles's claim as Eckles did not seek a "vacant" position, but rather an
open position to which other, more senior employees would be entitled."
requires employers to reassign disabled employees in violation of a bona ide seniority system of a
collective bargaining agreement when that reassignment is the only way the disabled employee can be
reasonably accommodated. Id. at 1045.46.
132. See id. The court did not literally create a perse ruling, but this has been the position adopted
by subsequent courts reading the case. The Eckles court explained, "We most certainly do not here
decide that all provisions of collective bargaining agreements will preempt a covered entity's duty to
reasonably accommodate a disabled employee under the ADA. We address only collectively-bargained
seniority systems that establish rights in other employees." Id. at 1046 n.9. Thus, the Eck/s holding
was based entirely on seniority being some vested right that the coworkers should not be obligated to
give up under the ADA. This rationale contains several flaws, most notably that the union's obligation
under the ADA should require the co-workers to accommodate their disabled co-workers.
133. This Article will focus on the courts' use of Title VII precedent to decide the ADA claim.
However, various commentators have likewise critiqued the courts' use of Rehabilitation Act precdent, not only in this factual setting, but in others as well. See, eg., Cooper, supra note 23, at 1426,
1436. Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts had adopted a virtual perse rule that the Act did not require
the reassignment of a disabled employee in violation of a bona fide seniority system. This was due in
part to some confusion over whether reassignment to a vacant position qualified as a reasonable accommodation. See Rose Daley-Rooney, Reconciling Conflicts Between the Americans %ithDisabilities
Act and the National Labor Relations Act to Accommodate People with Disabilities,6 DEPAUL Bus.
L. 387, 395-96 (1994) (noting that several cases "are cited for the proposition that an accommodation
is unreasonable if it conflicts with the collective bargaining agreement. These cases [actually) discuss
whether reassignment is a contemplated alternative for accommodating the worker with a disability.").
Congress avoided this ambiguity concerning the appropriateness of reassignment as a reasonable accommodation by explicitly including it in the ADA's list of possible "reasonable accommodations."
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9)B) (1994). Because of the differences between the two statutes, many commentators have questioned the wisdom of using Rehabilitation Act precedent to interpret the ADA's
provisions. See. e.g., Mary K. O'Melveny, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82 KY. L. 219, 234
(1994) (noting that since the ADA, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, requires reassignment, it is unclear
whether the ADA provides the same deference to seniority rights as does the Rehabilitation Act).
Although the Eckles court acknowledged this textual difference between the two acts, it still found the
Rehabilitation Act cases relevant to its holding. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048-49.
134. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1046-49.
135. Id. at 1047. The court noted that its conclusion was limited to collectively bargained seniority
rights as they had a "pre-existing special status in the law" that Congress had shown no intent to alter in
enacting the ADA. Id. at 1052.
136. Id. at 1047. Eckles argued that no employee would be fired as a result of his requested accommodation. Instead, a more senior employee would lose his current position and be forced to bid for
another one, while the job taken by the disabled employee would be "taken off the market." The court
responded to this argument by stating:
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In essence, the court took the view that a position is not vacant under the
ADA if it must be filled pursuant to a seniority system."3 7
Next the court looked briefly to the legislative history of the ADA.

Despite the explicit statements from members of both houses of Congress
that a collective bargaining agreement was only one factor to be considered

when judging the reasonableness of a request for an accommodation, 138the
court focused on other language in the House and Senate Reports noting
that "bumping" is not required to accommodate. 139 Under the court's

What would be lost to the other employees, particularly more senior employees, would be
some of the value of their seniority with the company, not their employment.... [U]nder a
seniority system ... few positions are ever truly "vacant," in the sense of being unfilled.
Rather, positions held by less senior employees are open to be bid upon and acquired by
more senior employees.... Within such a framework a "vacant position" would essentially
be one that an employee could acquire with his seniority and for which he could meet the
job requirements. Consequently, the accommodation demanded by Eckles does not constitute "reassignment to avacant position," but goes further.
Id.
137. See id. It is clear from a reading of the statute, however, that the ADA does not explicitly exempt from coverage vacant positions that more senior employees under acollective bargaining agreement may expect to fill. The only detail the legislative history provides with respect to vacant positions
is that employers are not required to "bump" other employees to create vacant positions in order to
comply with the accommodation requirement. This alone does not support the court's conclusion that
positions filled by seniority agreements are never truly vacant, and therefore exempt from coverage
under the ADA.
138. See id. at 1049-50; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2). The legislative history and interpretative guidelines of the ADA specify that collective bargaining agreements are only a relevant factor in the determination of reasonableness, not adispositive one. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
The relevant portion of the House Report states:
The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant, however, in determining whether a
given accommodation is reasonable. For example, if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as
a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an employee
with a disability without seniority to the job. However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue.... Conflicts between provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
and an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodation may be avoided by ensuring
that agreements negotiated after the effective date of this title contain a provision permitting
the employer to take all actions necessary to comply with this legislation.
Id.
139. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1050 ("Both the Senate and House Reports explicitly state that 'bumping' Is
not required, which would seem to clear up any remaining doubt about whether the ADA required
bumping in this particular case."). The court explained why it did not rely on the explicit language in
the legislative history that states that the existence of a collective bargaining agreement is not determinative. Id.
The language about collective bargaining agreements being "relevant but not determinative"
appears in the context of... discussion about reassignment to a vacant position for which
the disabled individual does not meet the pre-set job criteria. Thus aprovision inthe collective bargaining agreement that an employee could only be a second-shift welder after two
years with the company would be relevant but not determinative to deciding whether the
ADA requires, as a "reasonable accommodation," that the disabled one-year employee be
reassigned to a second-shift welder position. The finding that "bumping is not required" is
distinct and independent from this later discussion.
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analysis, it is equally egregious to bump an employee from the opportunity
to accept or bid for a position as it is to bump the employee from the actual

position.
After determining that the ADA's text and legislative history was of no

help to the plaintiff,40 the court examined Title VII case law to support its

holding that the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision did not displace union seniority rights.' 4' Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
requires employers to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of
employees; thus, the court's reasoning in EcIdes relies on a religious accommodation analysis under Title VII as a guidepost
for deciding what is a
4
"reasonable accommodation" under the ADA. 1
Specifically, the Eckles court relied on Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison.'43 In Hardison,the United States Supreme Court firmly rejected
the notion that the duty to reasonably accommodate the religious practices
of some employees superseded the seniority rights of others.'" The Hardi-

son Court held that, absent "a clear and express indication" from the legisCommentators have critiqued the Eckkes court's interpretation of legislative history. See. e.g.,
Hankinson, supra note 120, at 262 (arguing that the Eckles court did not give sufficient weight to the
legislative history indicating that the seniority system was to be a factor, not determnative, in the
application of the reassignment provision of the ADA); Brian P. Kavanaugh, Collectiv Bargaining
Agreements and the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Problematic Limitation on "Reasonable Accommodation"for the Union Employee, U. ILL L REv. 751, 765-67 (1999); William . McDevitt,
Seniority Systems and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The Fateof "ReasonableAccommodation"
After Eckles, 9 ST. THOMAS L REV. 359,382-83 (1997).
140. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047. It is important to note that the court entirely refused to acknowledge
the EEOC's Interpretative Guidance on this issue. The EEOC's Interpretative Guidance provides that
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement "may be relevant" to the determination of whether a
particular accommodation would "be unduly disruptive to its other employees or to the functioning of
its business." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1994 & App. 1997). There exists some dispute over the level of
deference that this type of agency statement should receive. See, e-g.. Christenson v. Harris County,
120 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2000) (noting the split over the level of deference to be given to nonlegislative rules issued by agencies and resolving the issue by stating that SMddmore deference should
apply). However, completely ignoring the existence of the guidance seem to be an abdication of the
court's statutory interpretation responsibility. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
(stating that administrative interpretations are "entitled to respect" from the reviewing court and providing a multi-factor test to be applied); Donna M. Nagy, JudicialReliance on RegulatoryInterpretations
in SEC No-Action Letters: CurrentProblems and a ProposedFramework,83 CORNELL L REV. 921,
996-1013 (1998) (advocating Skidmore's "persuasive authority appromch to agency regulatory interpretations in SEC no-action letters").
141. Eckes, 94 F.3d at 1047-48.
142. See id at 1048.
143. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
144. Id. at 79. In Hardison,an employee argued that his employer was required to accommodate his
religious practice not to work Saturdays, even if the accommodation required displacing employees
protected by a seniority agreement. Md at 66-69. The employee's claim was based on the 1972
amendments to Title VII, which required an employer "to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees." Id. at 66 (quoting 29 C.F.. § 1605.1 (1968)). In justifying its preference for seniority rights over the rights of an employee protected by Title VII, the Court relied on the
Title VII provisions that allow for seniority programs that ae not part of illegal discriminatory conduct.
See id. at 81-82.
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lature, seniority rights under a collective bargaining agreement are not to
be forsaken.' 45 Based on the Hardison Court's refusal to find that Title
VII's religious accommodation obligation necessarily superseded the collectively bargained seniority rights of other employees, the Eckles court
asserted that "[t]he language of the ADA, like that of Title VII, falls far
short of providing a[n] '... indication from Congress' that it intended 'reasonable accommodation'
to include infringing upon the seniority rights of
46
employees."
other
The Eckles court acknowledged in a footnote that the legislative history of the ADA contained a statement that the ADA's reasonable accommodation standard be held to a higher standard than the de minimus test the
Court applied in Hardison.'47 But the court concluded that Congress did
not reject the Hardison Court's overall holding indicating the importance
of seniority rights when threatened by a requested accommodation, stating,
"[I]t is clear from the context of this statement... that Congress intended
to reject the de minimus rule of Hardison,rather than the overall holding of
the case."' 48 Nevertheless, the court gave considerable weight to Title VII
caselaw, finding these precedents to be useful guideposts in determining
what Congress intended by using the term "reasonable accommodation" in
the ADA. 49 Based on its reading of the ADA, as informed by the Title VII
case law, the Ecides court upheld the collective bargaining agreement's
seniority provisions as an absolute bar to a disabled employee's claimed
entitlement to a reasonable accommodation.' 50
The court's rejection of the ADA's language and legislative history is
important as that is precisely where Congress manifested its intent that the
ADA's reasonable accommodation provision be utilized in a manner different from Title VII. The legislative history also reflects and emphasizes
Congress' intent that reassignment be a viable accommodation option. In
crafting the ADA, Congress plainly rejected Title VII's "more than a de
145. Id. at 79.

146. Ecldes, 94 F.3d at 1048. But see Condon A. McGlothlen & Gary N. Savine, Eckles v. Consoli.
dated Rail Corp.: Reconciling the ADA With Collective BargainingAgreements: Is This the Correct
Approach?,46 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 1043, 1054 (1997).
147. McGIothen & Savine, supra note 146, at 1049 n.12. The report of the House Committee on
Education and Labor states that, "[t]he Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciated
by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison.... are not applicable to this legislation.... [U]nder tho
ADA, reasonable accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level of 'requiring significant difficulty or expense' on the part of the employer, in light of the factors noted in the statute." HIR
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990) (citations omitted).
148. Ecldes,94F.3dat 1049 n.12.
149. Id. at 1048-49.
150. Id. at 1051-52. The court also asserted that Rule 2-H-I had no impact on the case. Specifically,
because the employer and the union were not required to include this rule in their collective bargaining
agreement, the court was unwilling to force them to exercise it. Therefore, the court held that Rule 2.
H-1 did not obligate the employer and union to accommodate a disabled employee in violation of
seniority rights, but instead, simply allowed such compromise if the parties so desired. Id. at 1050-51.
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minimis cost" standard for defining undue hardship--the standard endorsed
by the United States Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison.
Yet the Seventh Circuit cited Hardison as if it were at least persuasive in
construing the ADA. Accordingly, the Eckes court's analysis in this regard demonstrates either a disregard for or ignorance of plainly expressed
congressional intent.1 's
Although the two statutes are similar in many respects, Title I of the
ADA differs from Title VII in several ways that are important to this issue.
First, Congress specifically addressed the issue of the weight to be accorded seniority rights in Title VII,"n which provides specific protection
for the seniority rights of unprotected employees; however, Congress chose
to remain silent on this issue within the ADA." Second, the court ignores
the language of the ADA, which specifically recognizes the duty of an employer to reassign a disabled employee under the reasonable accommodation provision. Finally, the court fails to acknowledge that Congress recognized the potential for conflict and expected courts to balance the reasonable accommodation of reassignment against the potential harm to seniority rights, rather than to establish a bright-line rule prohibiting all accommodations in these instances." In acknowledging the potential conflict, Congress suggested that future collective bargaining agreements address the problem by including a provision that allows the employer to
modify its contract terms to accommodate the ADA.'
The majority's reliance on the general applicability of Title VII precedent in interpreting the ADA fails to acknowledge that the reassignment
issue is one where substantive differences between the two statutes severely limit the relevance, if any, of the use of Title VII in interpreting the
151. See eg., Daley-Rooney, supranote 133, at 409-12 (warning that aperse approzch to this issue

overprotects the rights of union workers while showing little respect for ADA goals); Ann C. Hodges,
Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth Circult's Mlsinterpretationof

Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLoYEE RMs. & EMhi. POLY J.123, 125-26 (1998) (asserting that not
every conflicting accommodation has a direct impact on an employee's contractual rights).

152. Section 703(h) of title VII provides: "lit shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system... .' 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(h) (1994 &
Supp. m11997). Likewise, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides that "[lit shall not be
unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization ...to obzerve the terms of a bona
fide seniority system...." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0.
153. The ADA, unlike other employment discrimination statutes, does not include an explicit provision protecting the seniority rights of other employees. According to one commentator, "[this omission may reflect Congress' intent to reject the line of Rehabilitation Act caselaw suggesting that seniority rights trump those of the disabled employee." John N1.Boyle, The Errorof Eckles: V7y Seniority
Rights Presentan Undue Hardshipfor Employees with Disabilities,35 DUQ. L REV. 1023, 1032
(1997); Hodges, supra note 151, at 158 (stating that the omission was intentional).
154. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
155. Id. See. eg.. O'Melveny, supra note 133, at 235 (noting that instead of tackling the issue of

potential conflicts between collective bargaining agreements and the ADA, Congress hoped that employers and unions would simply agree to "override" language in order to preempt any conflicts).
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ADA. The Eckles court's failure to defer to the ADA's own language,
interpretative guidelines and legislative history opens the court's decision

to charges that it is merely result-oriented given its approach to statutory
interpretation.
Another approach that better illustrates the intent of Congress and realizes the true limitations of the Title VII reasonable accommodation provision when interpreting the ADA can be seen in the D.C. Circuit's Aka V.
Washington Hospital Center' decision. In Aka, the court held that the

existence of a collective bargaining agreement is only one factor in determining the reasonableness of a requested accommodation,' and that reasonableness is to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, with the trier of fact
charged with the duty of determining whether reassignment is reasonable
in light of the collective bargaining agreement.'58 Rather than relying on
Title VII precedent to reach its conclusion about the scope of the ADA's
reasonable accommodation provision, the Aka court examined the ADA's

statutory language, legislative history, and EEOC interpretations and concluded that all three are inconsistent with Eckles' per se approach.'59
Like the plaintiff in Eckles, Etim Aka was a union member.'60 He
156. 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacatedpendingreh 'g en banc, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
reh g en banc, 154 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
157. Id. at 894 (determining that the issue of a conflict was premature, given that the evidence did
not establish a conflict between the collective bargaining agreement terms and the ADA); see also
Poindexter v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 914 F. Supp. 454, 457 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding
that the existence of a collective bargaining agreement does not preempt an ADA claim and refusing to
grant summary judgment for the defendant); Enick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396
(E.D. Tex. 1995) (classifying collective bargaining agreements as one factor in determining the reasonableness of an accommodation). The Poindexter plaintiff went on to win a jury trial. Poindexter v.
Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. CIV.A. 94-2341-GTV, 1996 WL 507303, at *1 (D. Kan.
Aug. 5, 1996).
158. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
159. Id. at 895-96. See Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 678 (Colo. 1998) (relying on Aka, the
Colorado Supreme Court also has interpreted the ADA's legislative history as imposing a greater burden to accommodate employees versus applicants).
160. Aka, 116 F.3d at 878. Like Eckles, the collective bargaining agreement in Aka contained a
provision that allowed for transfer of disabled workers in certain cases. Paragraph 14.5 of the collective bargaining agreement provided: "An employee who becomes handicapped and thereby unable to
perform his job shall be reassigned to another job he is able to perform whenever, in the sole discretion
of the Hospital, such reassignment is feasible and will not interfere with patient care or the orderly
operation of the Hospital." Id. at 892. The court determined that the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement may impose an obligation on the employer to reassign Aka, stating that, when read as a
whole, the "provision authorizing the transfer of handicapped employees to vacant positions creates an
exception to the otherwise-applicable [seniority procedure].' Id. Therefore, the court interpreted the
provision as limiting the seniority rights of the other employees by stipulating that in some cases these
rights would be abridged in order to reassign a disabled worker. Id. at 892-93. At least one other court
has held that a transfer provision for disabled workers in a collective bargaining agreement may limit
the seniority rights of other workers. See Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 741-42 (9th Cir.
1993) (upholding a transfer of a disabled employee in a unionized workplace with a seniority system
because the court determined that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement had modified the
rights of the other workers).
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worked as an orderly in a hospital where his position required him to engage in substantial amounts of heavy lifting.' During his employment,
Aka suffered heart problems and was advised by his doctor to seek a new
position with the hospital that required only a "light or moderate level of
exertion."" In response to Aka's request for reassignment, the hospital
informed him that no such jobs were available and placed him on a 'jobsearch leave.' 63 Although Aka applied for several positions in the hospital
that were posted as vacant, he failed to receive an offer for any of them.'"
He subsequently filed suit under the ADA, alleging that his employer's
refusal to reassign
him constituted employment discrimination based on his
65
disability.
On appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
employer, 166 the D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that collectively bargained
seniority systems were relevant, but not dispositive, with respect to the
reasonableness of a requested accommodation. 67 The court stated:
the fact that a requested accommodation does not fall squarely
within the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement
is relevant only insofar as it undermines the employee's claim that
the requested accommodation is 'reasonable,' or bolsters the employer's affirmative defense that the accommodation could not be
provided without 'undue hardship."'
In reaching its conclusion, the court made specific reference to the language of the ADA, its legislative history, and the EEOC regulations implementing the statute. 69 The court explicitly rejected the Eckles court's
reliance on Title VII. 70

First, the court determined that the plain language of the ADA explicitly includes reassignment to a vacant position as a possible reasonable
accommodation, absent undue hardship.' The court noted that potentially
161. Aka, 116 F.3d at 878.

162. Id.
163. Id.

164. Id.
165. Id. at 879.
166. See i&2

167. Id. at 893 ("[Wle note that although [the Rehabilitation] Act is quite similar to the ADA in most
respects, the two acts diverge sharply on this particular question, because the ADA explicitly suggests
'reassignment to a vacant position' as a form of 'reasonable accommodation' that may be required of
employers." (citations omitted)). The Aka court's conclusion that the Rehabilitation Act cases are not
relevant is supported by a majority of courts which have considered the reassignment issue in a
non-unionized workplace. See, eg., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996)

(concluding that a majority of courts have determined that the Rehabilitation Act cases are irrelevant in
interpreting the reassignment provision of the ADA).
168.
169.
170.
171.

Aka, 116 F.3d at 894 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 894-95.
Id. at 895-96.
Id. at 896.
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all reasonable accommodations specified in the language of the ADA could
conflict with the terms in most collective bargaining agreements.In The
court argued that under a rationale accepting the perse rule, the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement would always trump the ADA."' The
effect of this outcome would be to nullify the ADA's purpose of empowering the disabled in the unionized workplace. 7 4

Second, the court also recognized that the ADA's legislative history
emphasizes Congress' intent that a conflict between a reassignment accommodation and collectively bargained seniority rights should be consid-

ered, but that this conflict was not dispositive with respect to reasonableness. 75 Specifically, the court noted that both the House and Senate Re-

ports indicated that the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement are
only one factor in determining whether a particular accommodation, such
as reassignment, is reasonable.'76 Further, the Reports mentioned that a
collective bargaining agreement with a seniority provision could be a factor
in determining whether it was reasonable to reassign a disabled employee
without the required seniority to a particular position.'" Finally, the court
determined that the EEOC Interpretative Guidelines further buttressed this
legislative intent by classifying collective bargaining agreements as relevant, but not dispositive, in determining whether an accommodation was so
disruptive to the workforce as to constitute undue hardship." 8
172. Id. The Court further stated:
[A]lthough there is a conflict between the agreement and the "reasonable accommodation"
Aka seeks, the conflict is relatively minor, and therefore it appears to present little difficulty
for Aka's claim that the accommodation is "reasonable"; by the same token, the conflict appears to give Washington Hospital little purchase for any affirmative defense that the reassignment would impose an "undue hardship."... To put it in terms of the infringement on
the "seniority rights" of other employees, the other employees' seniority rights were already
limited by the handicapped-transfer provision, which prevented them from bidding for (and
asserting their seniority preference in regard to) vacancies required to be given to reassigned
handicapped employees under Paragraph 14.5; with the prospect of reassignments occurring
also under the ADA, this limit on the other employees' seniority rights may extend to at
most a few more reassignments, and may remain unchanged.
Id. at 897.
173. Id. at 896.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 895; see supranote 150 and accompanying text.
177. Aka, 116 F.3d at 895. The Report even provides an example ofa hypothetical case involving
seniority rights, stating:
[l]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given
amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a reason.
able accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to the job.
However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue.
See id.
178. Id. (providing that "the terms of a collective bargaining agreement 'may be relevant' to the
determination of whether... a particular accommodation would be 'unduly disruptive to other employ.
ees or to the functioning of its business' (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d)). Thus, unlike the
Eckes court, the Aka court specifically referenced the EEOC regulations when making its determination concerning how to balance the ADA with a collective bargaining agreement. Aka, 116 F.3d at 895.
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With respect to the Ecides court's reliance on Title VII case law, the

court stated, "the nature of the ADA prevents the Supreme Court's Title
VII decision in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison from being directly ap-

plicable to this case."' 79 The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court,
in its review of the Title VII duty of reasonable accommodation, held that

the statute did not require an employer "to take steps inconsistent with the
otherwise valid [collective bargaining] agreement.""tco However, the court

also noted that in Hardison,the Supreme Court had explicitly stated that it
reached its conclusion in the absence of any "clear and express indication
from Congress" explaining how courts should address such inconsistencies.'

The D.C. Circuit found that not only was the ADA's reasonable

accommodation scope broader than Title VII's provision, but also that the
ADA and its legislative history include the "clear and express" indications

that Title VII's history lacked. Specifically, the court pointed to the enumeration of "reassignment to a vacant position" in the statutory provision
requiring "reasonable accommodations," and the statements in reports from

both houses of Congress stressing that conflicts between requested accommodations and provisions of collective bargaining agreements (includ-

ing seniority systems) are not "determinative" in the inquiry into whether
the employer must provide the accommodations."'2
Based on this reading of the ADA's reasonable accommodations re-

quirement, the D.C. Circuit held that a per se bar to accommodation
through reassignment is an erroneous representation of the purpose and

intent of Title I." The court deemed it "inappropriate to draw blanket conclusions regarding whether the ADA can 'trump' provisions in collective

bargaining agreements, or whether the ADA can require the 'sacrificef' of
'rights' created in other employees by these agreements."'1' The court in179. Id at 896 n.14 (citation omitted).
180. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977).
181. Id.
182. Aka, 116 F.3d at 893; H.RL REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990) (CBycontrast, under the ADA,
reasonable accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level of 'requiring significant
difficulty or expense' on the part of the employer, in light of the factors noted in the statute-i.e., a
significantly higher standard than that articulated in Hardison.").
183. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 894, 895-96. This reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Bowman TransportationCorp., in which the Court stated: "[A] collective-bargaining
agreement may go further, enhancing the seniority status of certain employees for purposes of furthering public policy interests beyond what is required by statute, even though this will to some extent be
detrimental to the expectations acquired by other employees under the previous seniority agreement."
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 727,778-79 (1976).
184. Aka, 116 F3d at 896 (citation omitted). This decision was vacated pending review en bane.
Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacatedpending reh 'g en bane, 124 F.3d
1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh'gen bane, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998). On rehearing, the court determined there was insufficient evidence in the record to establish a conflict between the ADA and the
terms of the employer's collective bargaining agreement. SeeAka, 156 F.3d at 1306. Therefore, it was
premature to address the issue of conflict or to determine the appropriate analysis for such a conflict.
Id. The court remanded to the district court to determine the scope of the collective bargaining agree-
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stead adopted a balancing standard that weighs the need for an accommodation against the degree of hardship imposed by the infringement on seniority rights.' This balance, the court noted, should be based on the particular circumstances of each case with a potential "continuum" of resuits.'86

In adopting the Title VII practice of denying a requested reassignment
when it conflicts with collective bargaining agreements, a majority of
courts have ignored critical differences between the ADA and Title VII.
Congress intended the ADA to protect all disabled employees. As the statute has been interpreted by a majority of circuit courts, however, disabled
employees in a union have received less protection than non-disabled employees and disabled non-union members. The per se rule has essentially
excused union employers from the reassignment accommodation generally
required under the ADA. The ADA requires a flexible, case-by-case
analysis that balances collective labor rights against individual employment
rights. The fact that a requested reassignment conflicts with collectively
bargained seniority rights should not change, much less control, the analysis. The courts should allow the ADA to function as Congress intended,
through a balanced reasonable accommodation analysis, rather than adopting a perse rule developed under Title VII.
B. Title VI's Allocation of the Burden of Proof
The ADA does not clearly state what a plaintiff must prove to prevail
on a claim of intentional employment discrimination,' 87 and the Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue of the proper allocation of the burden of
proof in employment discrimination cases brought under the ADA. Courts
that have considered claims of employment discrimination under the
ment and whether there is any true conflict with the proposed reassignment and the collective bargaining agreement. Id. If the district court determines that a conflict exists, the initial appellate court's

rationale and conclusion, that there is noperse rule barring accommodations that contravene collective
bargaining agreements, would support a similar outcome on remand.
185. Aka, 116 F.3d at 896.

186. Id. The ADA explicitly states that reasonable accommodation includes, "reassignment to a
vacant position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994). Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that
the overall purpose of the ADA is to "bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social
mainstream of American life." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990). Permitting seniority rights

to prevent a disabled individual from remaining employed certainly would not advance the intent of
Congress to keep these individuals in the socio-economic mainstream.
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Although the ADA's text does not provide for an allocation of the
burdens for the various elements of a disparate treatment or disparate impact case, Congress specified
that the burdens of proof should be allocated consistently with cases brought under the Rehabilitation
Act. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72 (1990). Rehabilitation Act cases, however, have applied a

variety of approaches to the burden of proof issue, and thus, make "Congress' mandate somewhat

unclear." Stephanie Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination
on the Basis of PsychiatricDisability,85 CAL. L REV. 701, 743 (1997) (discussing the failure of Congress and courts to define the proper allocation of the burden of proof for ADA discrimination claims
under Title 1).
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ADA 8' have applied Title VII's burden-shifting analysis, first enunciated
in McDonnell
Douglas Corporationv. Green, and elaborated in subsequent
18 9
cases.
The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas created a structure for
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of intentional employment dis-

crimination even absent direct evidence of discrimination.'"

Under the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, as applied to the ADA, the plaintiff may

establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability
through evidence that the employee or applicant is an individual with a

disability; that she is qualified for the position in question, with or without
reasonable accommodation; and that, despite her qualifications, she was
the subject of a negative employment decision by the employer.19 ' The
burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions." If it does so, the plaintiff may

188. Every circuit except the Ninth and the Eleventh has, on at least one occasion, analyzed an ADA
claim using the structure of proof first set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
800-06 (1973). For representative samples, see MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., FM4PLOYmENT LAW §
2.47 (2d ed. 1999). See. eg., DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793,797 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying
McDonnell Douglasto an ADA claim for disparate treatment); Barth v. Gelb,2 F.3d 1180, 1185 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas analysis is appropriate for claims brought under the
Rehabilitation Act when employer asserts that it failed to hire or promote plaintiff for reasons unrelated
to his or her handicap), cert. denied sub. nor., Barth v. Duffy, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994).
189. 411 U.S. at 802 (establishing the four-part test for determining whether the plaintiff has established a prima fade case of discrimination). "[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Dviglas prima
facie case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, ., concurring). See. eg.,
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (describing defendant's burden to
provide legitimate, non.discriminatory reasons for their actions and plaintiff's right to introduce evi-

dence rebutting those reasons) (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993)
(same); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-53 (1981) (same).
190. McDonnell.Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.
191. See, eg., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying
McDonnell Douglas to ADA claims); Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981) (using
McDonnell Douglasto analyze Rehabilitation Act claims). The McDonnell Douglas Court noted that
this standard is flexible. "The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above
of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations." McDonnellDouglas,411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
192. McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802. "Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus
serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the
action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Burdine,450 U.S. at 255-56. The employer need not persuade
the court that its proffered reasons motivated its actions. Id. at 255 n.8. Instead, the emplo)r only
needs to produce admissible evidence on which the jury could reasonably conclude that discriminalory
animus had not motivated the employer. If the employer alleges a legitimate rea.on for its actions, the
employer rebuts the presumption of discrimination and it drops from the case. St. Mary's HonorCr.,
509 U.S. at 506-07 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). This does not mean, however, that tht jury
cannot consider evidence that the plaintiff already introduced as part of her prima faie cas
See
Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2109 (ruling that an employee who establishes a prima facie case under a federal
employment discrimination statute and presents evidence that the employer's non-dicrimninatory rea-
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and that intentional dis-

crimination, not the employer's proffered justification, was the real basis
for the employer's decision.' The trier of fact must then decide the ultimate question of the case: "whether..

.the defendant intentionally dis-

criminated against" the employee. 95 At all times, the plaintiff retains the

ultimate burden of persuasion to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employer intentionally discriminated against her.'96
This use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis may be

appropriate for some ADA claims. In some instances, there is a substantial overlap in the types of harm that the ADA and Title VII seek to pre-

vent. 97 As noted above, individuals with disabilities may be subject to
discrimination in which the employer refuses to provide the plaintiff with a
job opportunity merely because of the plaintiff's membership in the protected class.'
Active animus, stereotypes and misunderstandings about

the capabilities of individuals with disabilities may lead an employer to
deny an employment opportunity to an individual with a disability.'" In
such instances, the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework may prove a

useful tool in discovering the discriminatory basis of the employer's decison for the challenged employment decision is false is not always required to introduce additional
evidence ofpretext to sustain a favorable jury verdict).
193. Burdine,450 U.S. at 256.
194. Id.
195. St. Mary's HonorCir., 509 U.S. at 511. In St. Mary's Honor Cir., the district court, in a bench
trial, found that the reasons the defendant gave were not the real reasons for the plaintiffs demotion
and discharge. Id. at 508 & n.2. Despite this finding, the court was not persuaded that the plaintiffwas
the victim of intentional race discrimination. Id. at 508. Several considerations led to this conclusion,
"including the fact that two blacks sat on the disciplinary review board that recommended disciplining
respondent, that respondent's black subordinates who actually committed the violations were not disciplined, and that 'the number of black employees at St. Mary's remained constant..' Id. at 508 n.2.
196. Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106.
197. See, e.g., Deluca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995). In Deluca, the plaintiff, who had multiple sclerosis, sued his employer for firing him because of his disability. Id. Ho
claimed that other employees were treated more favorably. Central to his claim was the portion of the
ADA prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. This was a claim for disparate treatment, and because DeLuca had no direct proof of discrimina.
tion, he used the McDonnell Douglasburden-shifting method to prove indirectly that his employer had
fired him because he had multiple sclerosis. Id.
198. A 1973 survey of businesses in Los Angeles found "employer attitudes toward disabled persons
'vere less favorable than those toward any other prospective group of applicants surveyed, including
elderly individuals, minority-group members, ex-convicts, and student radicals." See Bows, supra
note 96, at 175.
199. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 n.9 (1987) (citing remarks of Sen. Walter Mondale regarding a woman crippled by arthritis who was denied ajob as a teacher because college trustees
thought "normal" students should not see her); Bagenstos, supra note 85, at 419 (discussing how the
potential of disabled people has been severely underestimated throughout history). But see JOHN
4ILIEDMAN & WILLLIAM ROTH, THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN AMERICA

288 (arguing that "a significant portion of this underutilization [of the talents of disabled individuals] Is
perfectly rational given the special margin of uncertainty in the information provided employers about
the economic value of disabled job applicants and job holders").
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sion.to For instance, in a case where the employer had fired an employee
with a partially amputated foot and provided several different explanations

as to why this firing occurred, the McDonnell Douglas analysis worked to
show that the employer's reasons were pretextual. 2 '
As mentioned earlier, however, disability discrimination differs sub-

stantially from race or gender discrimination because the discrimination is
usually not intentional.2

2

Therefore, it is frequently damaging to ADA

plaintiffs when courts apply a burden-shifting framework developed specifically for proving race or gender discrimination.
The McDonnell
Douglas analysis does not adequately address the complex interaction be-

tween a person's disability and that person's ability to perform ajob.

An

employer will almost never admit that race was considered when making

an employment decision.0 5 In contrast, many disability discrimination

defendants readily admit that decisions were based on the plaintiff's dis200. See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys., Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1184 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis will be appropriate in disability discrimination cases
where the plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimination and the employer disclaims reliance on the
plaintiff's disability). Likewise, some courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act have followed this
exact analysis when the defendant has denied taking the plaintiff's disability into account when making
its employment decision. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding placing the
burden of persuasion on plaintiff to prove that she can perform the essential functions of the job, with
or without reasonable accommodations, and giving the defendant the burden of production to show
plaintiff is not qualified for the position); Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 116-17 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a legally blind librarian in Rehabilitation Act claim must raise inference of discrimination
through proof of a prima facie case, the employer must come forward with evidence that the rejection
was for a legitimate reason and the plaintiff must then make a showing of pretext).
201. See Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 152 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'gand suggeston
for rehg en bane denied (Oct. 1, 1998) (holding that inference of discrimination is shown where employer changed his story as to why he terminated employee with disability); see also Cline v. Vial-Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that employee who was demoted was able to show
intentional discrimination by the employer); Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a night custodian with bipolar disorder established a sufficient disability claim under the
ADA and defeated a dismissal of the case, where the employer forced the night custodian to a different
assignment, thereby segregating him from other employees, and refused to allow the employce to apply
for another position).
202. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
203. One judge aptly commented, "Indeed, attempting to fit the problem of discrimination against
the handicapped into the model remedy for race discrimination is akin to fitting a square peg into a
round hole." Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171,206 (D.N.H. 1981).
204. See Mark E. Martin, Accommodating the Handicapped:The Meaning ofDlscrimlnationUnder
Section 504 ofthe RehabilitationAct, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 881, 883 (1980) (noting that "[d]iscrimination
against the handicapped poses unique problems because the trait that gives rise to the protected status
also limits an individual's ability to function"). Professor Martin further explained "It]his link suggests
that discrimination against the handicapped, unlike discrimination against other groups, necessarily
encompasses more than differential treatment caused by prejudicial attitudes. A full definition of
discrimination must address both the problem of prejudicial attitudes and the limitation caused by the
handicap itself." Id.
205. See Cooper, supra note 23, at 1428-29 (discussing how the narrow defense of bona fide occupational qualification under Title VII recognizes, in limited circumstances, that sM religion, and national
origin may be legitimate considerations in establishing job qualifications).
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ability." 6

Because of that disability, the defendant concluded either that
the plaintiff was not qualified, or that it would be too great an inconven-

ience to accommodate that disability. 27 The ADA's unique affirmative
burden to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability requires that
courts scrutinize an employer's explanations for not hiring a disabled person more closely than an employer's decisions under Title VII claims." 8
In particular, courts presiding over ADA cases scrutinize whether an
employer acted on the basis that an applicant did not possess the qualifications for the job, with or without accommodations, or whether inaccurate
assumptions that the disability might limit an applicant's ability to perform
the job influenced the employment decision. 0

Because the ADA defines "discrimination" against the disabled to include the failure to reasonably accommodate, it is particularly problematic
for courts to apply Title VII's burden of proof allocations to ADA claims
concerning the failure to reasonably accommodate.2t0

The McDonnell

206. See, e.g., White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357,361 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that where an
employer readily acknowledges that the decision to terminate the employee was premised, at least In
part, on the employee's disability, the application of the traditional burdens of proof is sufficient rather
than the McDonnellDouglas analysis).
207. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is suited directly for disparate treatment
claims, and not to those ADA claims where the focus is not on the presence of disparate treatment (as
the employers readily admit such treatment), but is instead an inquiry into the reasonableness (in the
sense of accommodation and hardship) of the inquiry. Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir.
1981). In Doe, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was not qualified because of her disability and,
therefore, the University did not have to attempt to reasonably accommodate her disability. See Id. at
769-70. The court held that once a plaintiff established a prima facie case, "the institution or employer
...[has to go] forward with evidence that the handicap is relevant to qualifications for the position
sought." Id. at 776. Under this analysis, the University had to offer evidence that the plaintiff's mental
illness affected her qualifications for medical school. Id. at 777. The University did not, however,
have to address whether it could reasonably accommodate the plaintiff so that she would be able to
perform in medical school. Id.
208. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1180 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that employers
often rely on an employee's disability in making employment decisions, and thus, when an employer
admits (or the evidence establishes) that its decision was based on the employee's disability, direct
evidence of discrimination exists so "application of the McDonnell Douglasburden-shifting framework
is inappropriate").
209. Employers often underestimate the productivity of workers and job applicants with disabilities
by reaching conclusions about their capabilities based upon the stereotypes and misconceptions of the
limiting effects of impairments. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 19 ("Our society automatically underestimates the capabilities of people with disabilities.... [A] disability, of itself, is never as disabling as It
first seems."). See also William G.Johnson, The Rehabilitation Act and Discrimination Against
Handicapped Workers: Does the Cure Fit the Disease?, in DIsABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 242,
247 (Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds., 2d ed. 1989) (noting that increased information concering a disabled worker's productivity reduces the likelihood of disability discrimination); Tamara
Dembo et al., A View of RehabilitationPsychology, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 719, 720 (1973) (discussing how the tendency of nonhandicapped people to devalue those with handicaps leads to discrimination in employment and other areas).
210. Most courts applying McDonnell Douglas to both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have
failed to even explain why Title VII standards are relevant to disability discrimination case law. See
Martin, supra note 204, at 887-88 (noting the differences in the types of discrimination faced by the

HeinOnline -- 33 Conn. L. Rev. 644 2000-2001

2001]

WHYDISABILITL4 WCL4IMSARE DIFFERENT

Douglas structure,2

' with its shiffing burdens, was conceived to overcome
the difficulties of proving discriminatory motive, for which frequently

there is no direct evidence.212 No such reliance on inference is necessary in
a disability lawsuit because an employer's failure to provide a reasonable

accommodation for a qualified individual with a disability (absent undue
hardship on the employer) is itself direct evidence of discrimination as
defined by the ADA.2 3 Thus, if the dispute between the parties concerns
whether a reasonable accommodation is available, it seems absurd to ask

whether the employer's stated position, that no reasonable accommodation
exists, is asserted to mask discriminatory animus when more often it refleets ignorance or insensitivity.?" The McDonnell Douglas framework
does not aid the court in its exploration of reasonable accommodation
claims because it does not further its own purpose, namely, "to sharpen the
inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination."2 5
Another potential problem arises with the application of the McDonnell
Douglas framework when an employer wishes to rely on the undue hardship defense in response to a claim of failure to reasonably accommo-

date."' As with most affirmative defenses, the defendant who raises it
should have the burden of proving it. 2"7 The defendant is the party with
disabled and stating that no court has directly discussed these differences or why it was appropriate to
apply the McDonnell Douglastest to Rehabilitation Act claims).
211. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
212. See, eg., Baxter v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 96-C-2060, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14358, at
*20 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1998) (noting that without specific proof ofa vacant position, the court could not
determine whether the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the emplo)e). Such an allocation
of the burden of proof allows the employer to skirt the duty of accommodation and to avoid the kind of
factual, interactive inquiry that the ADA requires. See, eg., Carrozza v. Howard County, 847 F. Supp.
365, 367-68 (D. Md. 1994) (granting the defendant summnay judgment based on the plaintifs "conclusory" suggestions (not qualifying as factual evidence) that the defendant could have reasonably
accommodated the limitations ofher bipolar disorder through any of five specific changes to her job).
213. See Montgomery v. John Deere & Co., 169 F.3d 556, 562 (th Cir. 1999) (Lay, J, concurring);
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmity. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1996); Monette, 90 F.3d at
1180-84.
214. Under many ADA claims, the inquiry focuses on whether the employer's deeision to not hire or
to fire a disabled employee wasjustified in light of the statutory accommodation burden, rather than the
common Title VII situation where the inquiry is into the very existence of class-based animus. See
supranotes 91-99 and accompanying text.
215. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981); see also Jeffrey 0.
Cooper, Interpretingthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The Trials of Textualism and the Practical
Limits ofPracticalReason, 74 TtL. L. REV. 1207, 1228-29 (2000).
216. The federal regulations interpreting the ADA, as well as the ADA itself, imply that an undue
hardship claim is an affirmative defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. HI 1997)
(stating that an employer must demonstrate undue hardship to avoid liability for employment discrimination for failure to reasonably accommodate); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1994) (stating that an employer
may use undue hardship to provide an employee with a "requested or necessary accommodation" as a
defense to a discrimination allegation).
217. As one circuit court noted.
The employer has greater knowledge of the essentials of the job than does the handicapped
applicant. The employer can look to its own experience, or, if that is not helpful, to that of
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the knowledge, experience, and resources to determine whether it can make
reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff.2" Placing the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove undue hardship will help ensure that employers live up to their procedural duties under the ADA. In cases that
center on reasonable accommodation, the McDonnell Douglas analysis
simply obscures the issues that lie at the heart of the reasonable
accommodation/undue hardship inquiry.
Some courts have recognized the problems in attempting to apply the
McDonnell Douglas structure to ADA claims.2" 9 In fact, several courts of
appeals have specifically developed an alternative framework for analyzing
the different types of discrimination claims brought under the ADA.22
For example, in situations where the employer admits they did not hire the

other employers who have provided jobs to individuals with handicaps similar to those of
the applicant in question. Furthermore, the employer may be able to obtain advice concerning possible accommodations from private and government sources.
Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981).
218. The affirmative burden to reasonably accommodate acknowledges that a disability is relevant to
job performance. Because of structural barriers, a disabled employee may be unable to perform a job
without the employer making some modifications. The ADA relieves an employer of the burden to
reasonably accommodate only when the employer can prove that the accommodation would be an
undue hardship. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (explaining the duty of employers to
reasonably accommodate).
219. See, e.g., Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that for a
failure to accommodate claim, the plaintiff must not only prove that she has a disability, but must also
prove that with a reasonable accommodation (which she must describe), she would be able to perform
the essential functions of her job; her employer then bears the burden of proving that the reasonable
accommodation would cause undue hardship); Montgomery v. John Deere & Co., 169 F.3d 556, 562
(8th Cir. 1999) (Lay, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the application of the McDonnell Douglas
framework to the plaintiff's ADA reasonable accommodation claim because it is not a disparato treatment claim); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-87 (11 th Cir.
1997) (holding that a plaintiff can show she was unlawfully discriminated against when an employer
does not reasonably accommodate her disability, unless the employer can show such an accommodation would pose an undue hardship); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th
Cir. 1996) (applying a reasonable accommodation analysis rather than the McDonnell Douglasanalysis
because the plaintiff's claim was a disability claim and not one of disparate treatment); Monette v. Elec.
Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that in disability claims, the burden
need not be shifted to the employer as to whether the employee can perform the job function because
traditional methods of proof are sufficient); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112
(8th Cir. 1995) (stating that "once the plaintiff makes a 'facial showing that reasonable accommodation
is possible,' the burden of production shifts to the employer to show that it is unable to accommodate
the employee" (quoting Mason v. Frank, 23 F.3d 315,318-19 (8th Cir. 1994)).
220. In cases where the employer relies on the employee's disability in its decision-making, the
disputed issue will almost always be whether the employee is "otherwise qualified" to perform the job.
Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 116-17 (8th Cir. 1985); Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d
Cir. 1981). These cases fall into two broad categories: (1) those in which the plaintiff is not seeking a
reasonable accommodation, but is instead making the straightforward claim that he or she can, in fact,
function capably in the sought after position as it exists; and (2) those in which the plaintiff challenges
a particular job requirement as unessential or claims that he or she can do the job with reasonable
accommodations on the part of the employer.
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plaintiff because of her disability,l these courts require the plaintiff to first
establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she is a qualified indi-

vidual with a disability who can perform the essential functions of the job,
with or without reasonable accommodations.m

The employer can avoid

liability only by showing that it would be an undue hardship to reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff.P As with other affirmative defensesi 4 the
employer has the burden of persuasion.m
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Bultemeyer v. Forth Wayne Community Schools provides an example of the alternative burden-shifting framework. In that case, the court overturned the district court's dismissal of

Bultemeyer's case, noting that the district court had mistakenly relied on
the court's holding in an ADA claim involving disparate treatment. " 6 The
court found that because Bultemeyer had based his complaint on the

221. See, e.g., Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 297 (refusing to re-employ an individual for a postal carrier
position because of a physical handicap).
222. Id. at 309-10. However, the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that the accommodation is objectively reasonable. Additionally. nothing in
the statute alters the burden the disabled individual bears of establishing that she is capable ofperforming the essential functions of the job with the proposed accommodation. Put simply, if the employer
claims that a proposed accommodation will impose an undue hardship, the employer must prove that
fact. If the employer claims instead that the disabled individual would be unqualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, even with the proposed accommodation, the disabled individual must
prove that she would in fact be qualified for the job if the employer were to adopt the proposed ccommodation.
223. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288-89 (1987) (holding that the ultimate issue was
whether the defendant could reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's tuberculosis); Barth v. Gelb, 2
F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that when an agency invokes the affirmative defense of
inability to reasonably accommodate, the defendant should have the burden of proving undue hardship); Prewitt,662 F.2d at 308 (stating that the employer has greater knowledge of the essential duties
of the job and therefore, is in a better position to prove undue hardship). The Prevdit court goes on to
state that once the employer meets its burden, "the plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with
evidence concerning his individual capabilities and suggestions for possible accommodations to rebut
the employer's evidence." Id. at 308.
224. Similarly, if a disabled individual is challenging a particularjob requirement as unessential, the
employer will bear the burden of proving that the challenged criterion is necessary. See 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(6) (1994). The employer must demonstrate that he does not discriminate and dots not:
Us[e] qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that scre out or
tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities
unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to
be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.
Id. This language indicates that an employer bears the burden of proving that a particular hiring policy
is "job-related" and "consistent with business necessity." Id.
225. The language of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) makes it clear that the employer has the burden of
persuasion on whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text; see also Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
employee need only make a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible and the burden
then shifts to the employer to prove inability to accommodate); Preiltt,662 F.2d at 308 (finding that
under the Rehabilitation Act, the employer has the duty to make a reasonable acommodation, and thus
the burden ofproving its inability to make the accommodation).
226. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir. 1996).
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provision,227

ADA's reasonable accommodation
his claim alleged facts
that, if proven, could directly establish a violation of the ADA.228 The
court held that because Bultemeyer's case was not a disparate treatment
case, the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method of proof
was unnecessary and inappropriate.? 9 The court proceeded to analyze
Bultemeyer's claims under the regular reasonable accommodation analy2i.30

This approach more accurately reflects the goals of the ADA and pre-

vents an employer from circumventing the ADA's mandate to reasonably
accommodate." This, however, has not kept a number of courts from
attempting to fit reasonable accommodation into the McDonnell Douglas
framework."2 Because the alternative approach to McDonnell Douglas has

not been adopted by all the circuit courts, trial courts and litigants are left
without clear guidelines on what they will have to prove at trial, and what
their burden of proof will be on key issues such as reasonable accommodation.
For the ADA to achieve its intended effect, courts must allocate the
burden of proof for a cause of action under the Act differently than they
have with other types of employment discrimination claims. In particular,
courts should not apply the McDonnellDouglas allocation of the burden of
proof to all ADA employment discrimination claims. Because of the
unique relationship between a disability, an individual's ability to perform
a job and the unique affirmative burden on employers to reasonably ac-

commodate workers with disabilities, courts should place higher burdens
227. Id. Mr. Bultemeyer claims that he was a qualified individual with a disability and that his
employer did not reasonably accommodate him.
228. Id. (noting that "[i]f it is true that [his employer] should have reasonably accommodated Bultemeyer's disability and did not, [his employer] has discriminated against him"). The court further stated
that "Bultemeyer is not complaining that [his employer] treated him differently and less favorably than
other, non-disabled employees. He is not comparing his treatment to that of any other... employee.
[Rather, h]is complaint relates solely to [his employer's] failure to reasonably accommodate his disabil-

ity." Id.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (setting forth the reasonable accommodation
analysis).
231. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 890-91 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that a reasonable
accommodation claim is not subject to the familiar three-part analysis of McDonnell Douglasbut has
its own specialized legal standards); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (recognizing
three types of handicap discrimination claims, with special evaluation standard for each: (1) where the
employer claims a non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action; (2) where the employer maintains that the employee is not an otherwise qualified individual with a disability or that no
reasonable accommodation is available, so that the plaintiff falls outside the scope of ADA protection;
and (3) where the employer offers the affirmative undue hardship defense for its actions).
232. See. e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161-71 (10th Cir. 1999); Nesser v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135,
141 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 882-83 (6th Cir. 1996); Jacques
v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506,511 (1st Cir. 1996).
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on employers who wish to escape liability in disability discrimination
cases. Without this allocation of burden of proof, the disabled will continue to face unnecessary employment discrimination.
C. Title V'7's Constructive DischargeStandards

Another area in which Title VII case law has been applied to the ADA
involves the constructive discharge doctrine. Unlike the classic express

discharge, which arises when an employer either fires or refuses to hire a
protected individual,

3

constructive discharge concerns employees who are

subjected to discriminatory treatment and resign due to the intolerable
working conditions.'
The constructive discharge doctrine was developed under the National

Labor Relations Aces and later was adopted in Title VII cases?' To date,
each circuit court uses the same test for establishing a constructive discharge, regardless of the particular employment statute at issue."

How-

233. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (establishing the threepart approach for proving disparate treatment with circumstantial evidence in hiring cases). Although
McDonnell Douglas was a hiring case, lower courts have adopted it for the purpose of discipline, discharge, and constructive discharge claims. See. eg., Parton v. GTE N., Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 151-53 (8th
Cir. 1992) (applying McDonnell Douglas analysis to determine employee discharge was not motivated
by gender); Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 548-49 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying McDonnell
Douglas test to a national origin discrimination claim involving termination); Penyman v. Johnson
Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying McDonnell Douglas test to a claim or
discrimination against women in hiring, firing, and termination actions by the cmployer).
234. See. e.g., Barnes v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 778 F.2d 1096. 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing constructive discharge claim arising when employee was confronted with imminent discharge or a
"choice to resign"). For a general overview of the constructive discharge doctrine, see Richard M.
DeAgazio, Note, Promoting Fairness:A Proposalfor a More Reasonable Standard of Constructive
Dischargein Title VII Denialof Promotion Cases, 19 FORDHM I URB. LJ. 979 (1992). See generally
ROTHSTEIN E"AL, supra note 188, § 2.10. If the employee vas not constructively discharged, she is
not entitled to the remedies of back pay, reinstatement or front pay, or other damages, even if the court
finds that the employer engaged in discriminatory practices before the resignation. Id.; see also Muller
v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923. 930 (10th Cir. 1975) ("Unless [plaintiff] was constructively
discharged, he would not be entitled to damages in the form of backpay... from the date of leaving
[the defendant's] employ.").
235. See. eg., NLRB v. Tricor Prods., Inc., 636 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. SaxeGlassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir. 1953). For a critique of the wholesale adoption or
the NRLB standards into Title VII, see Rebecca Hanner White, Modern DiscriminationTheory and The
National Labor Relations Act, 39 WM. & MARY L REV. 99 (1997); Martin W. O'Toole, Note, Chaosing a StandardforConstructiveDischargein Title VII Litigation,71 CORNELL L REV. 587 (1986).
236. See, e.g., Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1993) (reviewing Rehabilitation Act
claims for constructive discharge); McCann v. Litton Sys. Inc., 986 F.2d 946, 950-53 (5th Cir. 1993)
(reviewing age and race discrimination claims where demotion was a condition alleged to be intolerable).
237. See. eg., Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1079 n.5 (3d Cir.,1992) ("ITihe
doctrine of constructive discharge is the same in all employee discrimination claims ... :); see also
DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc. 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that in analyzing constructive
discharge claims under the ADA, it is appropriate to borrow from the court's approach under Title VII);
Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that federal courts bor-
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ever, the application of that test for establishing a constructive discharge in
employment discrimination cases varies widely between the circuits.3 3
When courts apply these differing standards to ADA cases, the disabled
plaintiff faces the barrier of proving discriminatory intent to recover under
the constructive discharge claim.
If the employer discriminates against a disabled employee who subsequently resigns, the employee's allegations of constructive discharge must
meet the same prima facie requirements as for any other violation under the
ADA. 9 To satisfy the constructive discharge requirements, the plaintiff
must also demonstrate that discriminatory employment practices made
working conditions so intolerable that resignation was the only option.24
Some circuits further require that the plaintiff prove that the employer intended to force the employee to resign.24 However, the majority of circuits
do not require a showing of specific intent on the part of the employer,2 42
rowed the constructive discharge doctrine from labor law and listing cases that apply the constructive
discharge doctrine across various civil rights statutes).
238. See generally BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 259 (1992) (noting that courts differ as to "whether an employer is responsible for a constructive discharge only when the employer specifically intends to oust the (employee], or whenever
the employer is responsible for the offensive conduct that causes" the resignation); I MERRICK T.
RosSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 10.5 (West Group 2000) (noting that courts have differed
on what is required for a finding of constructive discharge); Mark S. Kende, DeconstructingConstructive Discharge: The Misapplicationof Constructive DischargeStandards in Employment Discrimination Remedies, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39, 52 (1995) (noting the variety of approaches courts take to
constructive discharge claims).
239. Thus, a plaintiff must establish that she: (1) is a disabled person within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) is an otherwise qualified individual; and (3) was excluded from that employment under
circumstances from which an inference of unlawful discrimination arises. Borkowski v. Valley Cent.
Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1995).
240. James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989,992 (10th Cir. 1992).
241. Parrish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 92 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 1996); Johnson, 991 F.2d at 126,
132; Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the employee must not
only show objective feelings about workplace conditions but must also show the intent of the employer;
the employer would have foreseen that a reasonable employee would want to resign). Many federal
courts apply strict constructive discharge principles because they believe that employees who have been
discriminatorily demoted, transferred, or denied promotion should stay and challenge the employer's
discrimination internally. These courts do not want employees leaving at the smallest signs of discrimination and then suing for an unjustified windfall. See Ira M. Saxe, Note, ConstructiveDischarge
Under the ADEA: An Argument for the Intent Standard, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 985 (1987)
("[E]mployees should be discouraged from resigning when doing so deprives the employer of the
opportunity to limit its liability by resolving the problems leading to the employee's resignation."). For
a critique of the intent test for constructive discharge claims under the ADEA, see Sheila Finnegan,
ConstructiveDischarge Under Title VII and the ADEA, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 561, 580 (1986) (arguing
that the reasonable person test should be applied to ADEA claims for constructive discharge).
242. See, e.g., Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying the reasonable employee standard to find the change in job responsibilities with no loss of pay or change of
tide insufficient to establish constructive discharge); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 907-08
(I th Cir. 1982) (adopting the reasonable employee standard and holding hostile and offensive work
environment sufficient to constitute constructive discharge); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1174
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying the reasonable employee standard to a constructive discharge in which the
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and find constructive discharge where the working conditions are so intolerable that "a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would resign." 2
Under either the "intent" standard or the "reasonable person" standard, the
plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory actions of the employer made
the work environment intolerable. 2"
A determination that working conditions are intolerable is made using
a totality of the circumstances approach.245 A finding of discrimination
alone will not always negate a finding that the employee quit voluntarily. 2"
The employee's resignation must be related to the employer's actions, or
inactions, rather than for personal reasons.247 Some courts require that constructive discharge be justified by the "existence of certain 'aggravating
factors."' 2" Aggravating factors can include a history of discriminatory
opportunity for promotion, lateral transfer, and increased educational training had been denied); Heagney v. Univ. of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying the reasonable emplo)e standard to find unequal pay insufficient to constitute constructive discharge); Bourque v. Powell Elec.
Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 61-62 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that under the reasonable employee standard,
discrimination manifesting itself in the form of unequal pay cannot, alone, support a constructive dis-

charge).
243. Suttles v. United States Postal Serv., 927 F. Supp. 990, 1011 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that
plaintiff need not show specific intent by the employer); Hurley-Bardige v. Brown, 900 F. Supp. 567,
572-73 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that a majority of courts do not require a showing of intent by the
employer, but adhere to a more lenient standard that the employee must only prove that a reasonable
person would have resigned as a result of workplace conditions); see also Greenberg v. Union Camp
Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that the standard for constructive discharge is a work
environment so hostile that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign); Lynch v. Freeman,
817 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir.
1984); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
244. Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1982); Muller v. United States
Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 927 (10th Cir. 1975).
245. See, e-g., Bourque, 617 F.2d at 66 (noting that refusal to grant damages award for plaintiff's
back pay after resignation was not inconsistent with Title VII because "secity and the policies underlying Title VII will be best served if, wherever possible, unlawful discrimination is attacked within the
context of existing employment relationships"); see also Frank S. Ravitch, Beond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action for Worplace Hara.srnent Under
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1475, 1482-83 (194) (dt-cibing the
framework used in hostile environment cases).
246. See Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that there is no constructive
discharge for failure to reasonably accommodate); Boldini v. Postmaster Gen., 928 F. Supp. 125, 13233 (D.N.H. 1995) (unclear whether violation of reasonable accommodation requirement is sufficient
evidence of constructive discharge); Hurley-Bardige, 900 F. Supp. at 571 (requiring plaintiff to show
more than failure to accommodate and stating that plaintiffneeds to show evidence that her co-workers
and supervisors demeaned her).
247. See, eg., Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 1162 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding no
constructive discharge where plaintiff alleged only overzealous supervision and unduly harsh criticism
of performance); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (Every job has its
frustrations, challenges and disappointments; ... [an employee] is not... guaranteed a working environment free of stress."); Clark 665 F.2d at 1173 (holding that discrimination alone will not constitute
a constructive discharge).
248. Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See, eg., Thomas v.
Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that plaintiff must show "aggravating factors"
such as a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment to sustain a constructive discharge claim);
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acts, an atmosphere of hostility toward an employee that causes a loss of
confidence or humiliates the employee, 249 or a pattern of continuous discriminatory behavior as opposed to an isolated act.25 In the Sixth Circuit,
deliberate intent can be considered an "aggravating factor," but it is not
considered an absolute prerequisite to establishing a constructive discharge.Y'
Major problems arise when courts apply the Title VII constructive discharge standard to ADA constructive discharge claims. Because Title VII
does not include the same affirmative requirement that employers make
reasonable accommodations, requiring the plaintiff also to prove the exis-

tence of an "aggravating factor" or intent again undermines the ability of
the plaintiff to recover.
Indeed, courts have held that the failure to make a reasonable accommodation, while technically a violation of the ADA, will not itself satisfy

the standard for constructive discharge. For example, in Erjavac v. Holy
Family Health Plus, 52 the plaintiff, an insulin-dependent diabetic, requested more flexible access to the bathroom as a reasonable accommoda-

tion. 3 Rather than grant her request, her employer imposed new requirements on break time that made it more difficult for her to obtain flexible
bathroom breaks. Although the court recognized that Erjavac might have

Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff must show proof of
aggravating factors in addition to proof of discrimination); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d
61, 66 (using the phrase "aggravating situation" interchangeably with "intolerable conditions"); Young
v. Howmet Corp., No. 1-95-CV-1 18, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4631, at *11 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 1996)
(requiring that an individual show more than a mere failure to accommodate for a constructive discharge under the Rehabilitation Act).
249. SeeMungin, 116 F.3d at 1558 (holding that an employee's resignation must be accompanied by
aggravating factors); Tonry v. Security Experts, Inc., 20 F.3d 967, 971-72 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
demotion and reassignment to graveyard shift, salary cut, and loss of other benefits supported constructive discharge claim).
250. Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that a continuous
pattern of discrimination may be sufficient to show an aggravating factor).
251. Young, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4631, at *25 (noting that the Fourth Circuit applies a "standard
more stringent than Michigan law to the extent that plaintiff was required to prove an intent to discharge"); see Yates, 819 F.2d at 637 (requiring a plaintiff to show "aggravating factors" in addition to
discrimination); see also O'Toole, supranote 235, at 588 (arguing that the courts which apply an intent
standard incorrectly burden the plaintiffs ability to bring employment discrimination claims).
252. 13 F. Supp 2d. 737, 752 (N.D. Il1.1998) (holding that the plaintiff could not satisfy the standard
for construction discharge where the employer had failed to reasonably accommodate her disability);
see also Miranda v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 91 F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an
employee who failed to receive reasonable accommodation could not make out a claim for constructive
discharge because she failed to identify any actions by her employer that created an intolerable working
environment even though one of the competing applicants for the supervising position the plaintiff
sought draped her house in toilet paper after learning that she suffered from a bowel disorder).
253. Erjavac, 13 F. Supp. 2d. at 751.
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had a claim for failure to reasonably accommodate her disability,' it dismissed her constructive discharge claims because of lack of aggravating
factorsO's

Some courts have noted, in dicta, that the failure to make reasonable
accommodation, by itself, could create a working environment so hostile

that a reasonable employee would resign his or her position. ' However,
these courts indicate that this would not be the norm. For example, the
court in Hurley-Bardigev. Brown observed that there could be situations
where an employer who refused to build a ramp or elevator needed by an
employee who used a wheelchair could be found guilty of constructively

discharging that employee in violation of the ADA without proof of aggravating factors.'

The requirement in some courts that an employee prove intentional
discrimination further compromises the ability of disabled employees to
recover for constructive discharge because most of the discrimination
against the disabled has been labeled "unconscious" or the result of "be-

nign neglect. 'a' Although a majority of appellate courts do not require a
plaintiff to show that the employer harbored a "deliberate intent" to force
th employee to resign in order to establish a constructive discharge,s 9 both
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have so required'
In these circuits, if the
254. Id. at 753 ("While Erjavac may indeed succeed in proving disability discrimination, there is no
evidence that it was 'aggravated' beyond ordinary discrimination, or that her working conditions required resignation.").
255. Id. at 752-53 (finding that no reasonable juror could find Ejavac's work conditions so intolerable that she was forced to resign); see also Hogue v. MQS Inspection, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 714, 723-24
(D. Colo. 1995) (holding that failure to make reasonable accommodation was insufficient to support
constructive discharge claim because it did not make working conditions intolerable).
256. Hurley-Bardige v. Brown, 900 F. Supp. 567, 573 n.7 (D. Mass. 1995); cf.Sanchez v. Puerto
Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 719 (ist Cir. 1994) ("[C]onstructive discharge... occurls] when an employer effectively prevents an employee from performing his job.").
257. Hurley-Bardige, 900 F. Supp. at 573 n.7 Commentators have provided other potential exampies as well. See Ravitch, supra note 245, at 1511-12 (stating that where an employer refused to transfer an employee with a respiratory condition to a smoke-free work station, this failure to accommodate
could create a hostile work environment sufficient to constitute constructive discharge).
258. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
259. See, eg., Hurley-Bardige,900 F. Supp. at 572 (noting that the First Circuit adheres to a more
lenient standard under which an employee need only prove that a reasonable person would have resigned as a result of workplace conditions). In these circuits, "[t]he focus is upon the reasonable reaction of the employee [to her working conditions]; it is not necessary to show that the employer subjectively intended to force a resignation. ' Junior v. Texaco, Inc., 688 F.2d 377, 379.(Sth Cir. 1932). See
Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476,480 (Ist Cir. 1993); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617
F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980). Under this standard, the employee need show only that he or she %as faced
with working conditions under which a "reasonable person in the employee's position and circumstances would have felt compelled to resign." Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644
F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981).
260. Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1133 (4th Cir. 1995); Harvey v. City of
Little Rock, 78 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.
1981). But see Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 101, 3 F.3d 281 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that an employer's state of mind is not controlling in a claim of constructive discharge and
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employee cannot show that the employer intended to force the employee to

resign, no constructive discharge claim can be sustained.26

The impact of this precedent requiring deliberate intent or aggravating
factor is particularly harmful to claims brought under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.262 As noted earlier, these laws differ from other civil
rights laws in that they mandate an affirmative obligation to accommodate
employee disabilities on the part of the employer.263 Under the laws in
those circuits requiring employer intent or an "aggravating factor," a disabled plaintiff will not be able to set forth a viable constructive discharge

claim based solely on an employer's failure to provide reasonable accommodations. This additional burden on the disabled employee effectively
eviscerates the protections ostensibly afforded under both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.
This under-protective standard by which some circuits assess constructive discharge claims can also reduce the effectiveness of the protections
afforded by the disability laws.2" The drafters of both the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA clearly stipulated that employer intent not play a role in
the determination of discrimination. The ADA's first section describes the
thus, it did not matter that an employer only intended to have "fun" with an employee rather than to
compel resignation).
261. Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1993); Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d at 1256.
262. See Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1133 (4th Cir. 1995) (comparing and distinguishing the requirements
of constructive discharge and harassment). The courts noted that claims for workplace harassment and
constructive discharge are both governed by a two-part test. Id. The first part of each test is the scvcrity of the conditions. Id. Whereas the conduct must be "severe and pervasive" for a harassment claim,
the work environment for a claim of constructive discharge must be "intolerable." Second, the employer's response is critical in both types of claims. Id. To overcome liability for a hostile environment harassment claim, the employer must have taken prompt and adequate action. Id. To defeat a
constructive discharge claim, the employer must have taken action reasonably calculated to end the
intolerable working environment. Id. Focusing on this last test, the court explained by means of exampie that a superficial response by the employer should not suffice to defeat a constructive discharge:
Suppose for example that an employee suffers workplace harassment on account of his national origin and his employer responds with token action that does not sincerely address the
problem. If the harassment is severe and pervasive, the employee can bring a workplace
harassment claim and obtain relief. If, however, the environment became intolerable and
the employee was forced to resign, he would be unable (in the face of a token response) to
bring a constructive discharge claim and would therefore be without a remedy. Requiring a
response reasonably calculated to end the intolerable environment avoids this inequitable resuit.
Id.; see also Kende, supra note 238, at 78 (arguing that courts should apply mitigation of damages
principles to constructive discharge claims rather than an intent test).
263. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
264. See Southeastern Cmty. CoIl. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979). The ADA states that Its
goals are to "assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency for [disabled] individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aXS) (1994). Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to remedy the "glaring neglect" of the disabled. 118 CONG. REc. 526 (1972) (statement of
Sen. Percy). The framers of the Act recognized that the nation no longer could "tolerate the invisibility
of the handicapped in America." 118 CONG. REC. 525-(1972) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Likewise, Congress passed the ADA to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l).
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breadth of the law's prohibition on discrimination and Congress' aim that
the ADA address all forms of discrimination that the disabled face, not just
intentional discrimination.26 Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted in
dicta that "much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the
Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the
Act construed to prescribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent."
To achieve the remedial purposes that led Congress to pass the
Rehabilitation Act, "harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect as well as by design" must be rooted out.
An employer that is insensitive to the needs of an employee with a disability will, in many cases, cause the same injuries as an employer who
deliberately forces a disabled employee to resign. A brief review of two
Rehabilitation Act cases in different circuits demonstrates the discordant
outcomes that the intent requirement can cause.
26 the court held that an emotionally and mentally
In Kent v. Derwinski,
disabled employee was constructively discharged, as defined by Ninth Circuit case law, because she was subject to intolerable conditions, namely
unnecessary discipline and taunting.269 To prove constructive discharge,
the plaintiff had only to demonstrate that "whether, judging from a totality
of the circumstances, a reasonable person in [her] position would have felt
that she was 'forced 270to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory
working conditions.' ,
In Kent, the Veterans Administration Medical Center (VAMC) hired
Ms. Kent to work in the VAMC laundry. Although Ms. Kent's work received "fully satisfactory" evaluations initially, her work and her health
began to suffer once the facility hired a new supervisor.2 7 ' Ms. Kent was

265. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) provides:

[The Congress finds that] individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms
of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies,
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities.
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.
Id.
266. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296-97 (1985).
267. Id. at 297.
268. 790 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (section 501 case holding that employee who had been
subjected to taunting and ridicule of co-workers about her mental retardation and emotional disability
was constructively discharged and subjected to inappropriate discipline).
269. Id. at 1040. "From the beginning of her employment... Ms. Kent was taunted by co-workers
as being 'brain dead,' or a 'droolie,' or looking like she was 'hung-over,' or had been 'sniffing glue.'"
Id. at 1036. Ms. Kent's first supervisor reprimanded any worker who taunted her in this manner. Id.
Her later supervisor, however, would lecture Ms. Kent for up to two hours on concerns ranging from
getting along with her co-workers to her work productivity. Id. at 1037,1040.
270. Id.at 1040.
271. Id. at 1036.
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hospitalized twice for breakdowns and eventually resigned her position.272
The court found that Ms. Kent's supervisor subjected her to inappropriate
disciplinary measures, and failed to prevent taunting by co-workers. 3
Although the court noted that the VAMC management had tried to accommodate Ms. Kent's disability by training and counseling Ms. Kent's
supervisor in appropriate methods of supervision and discipline, the court
'
found that these efforts were "too little too late."274
There was no indication that the work environment would change, and it was so overwhelming
that "a reasonable person... would have found Ms. Kent's work situation
intolerable and discriminatory because of her handicap and would have felt
forced to quit."'2 'S Because the Kent court found that the employer's good
faith efforts at accommodation were insufficient and that the failure to provide reasonable accommodation created intolerable working conditions
these facts resulted in constructive discharge.276
However, in Johnson v. Shalala, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that an employee failed to establish that she was constructively discharged because she could not show employer intent.2" Dr. Johnson suffered from a number of medical ailments, the most troublesome of which
was "idiopathic CNS hypersomnolence, a form of narcolepsy or excessive
sleepiness that required her to sleep nine or more hours per night and to
take short naps during the day."278 Dr. Johnson also had cardiac arrhythmia, which "precluded her from taking medication to control her narcolepsy." 27 These medical problems were exacerbated by the fact that she
272. Id. at 1038.
273. Id. at 1040. Ms. Kent's supervisor would "lecture Ms. Kent ...ordering Ms. Kent to stand
against the wall and not work, grabbing Ms. Kent's arm in the restroom and ordering her to keep silent
about the conditions in the laundry, and criticizing Ms. Kent for her behavior, which was due to her
handicap." Id. at 1037.
274. Id. at 1041. The court found,
Even though efforts were made to accommodate Ms. Kent's handicap by training, counseling and discussion, no real change took place. Ms. Randall [Ms. Kent's supervisor]
continued to make numerous critical remarks to Ms. Kent about her work productivity...
to single her out for discipline if any dispute arose involving her. Co-workers continued
the taunting and name calling.
Id. at 1040.
275. Id. at 1041. For a variety of perspectives on the duty to reasonably accommodate mental im.
pairments, see Loretta K. Haggard, ReasonableAccommodation ofIndividuals With MentalDisabilities
and Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders Under Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 43
WASH. U. J.URB. & CONTEMP. L. 343 (1993); Paul Mickey, Jr. & Maryclena Pardo, Dealing with
Mental DisabilitiesUnder the ADA, 9 LAB. LAW. 531 (1993); Laura F. Rothstein, The Employer's Duty
to Accommodate Performance and Conduct Deficiencies of Individuals with Mental Impairments
Under DisabilityDiscriminationLaws, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 931 (1997); Deborah Zuckerman, Rea.
sonable Accommodation for People with Mental Illness Under the ADA, 17 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 311 (1993).

276. See Kent, 790 F. Supp. at 1041.
277. 991 F.2d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 1993).
278. Id. at 128.
279. Id.
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had a commuting time of approximately one hour, necessitating "that she
pull over for fifteen-minute naps, making it difficult for her to arrive at
work at a fixed time."''
Dr. Johnson's employer implemented several accommodations at her
request, but the district court found that the employer "had not reasonably
accommodated Johnson's handicap and had constructively discharged her
by failing to act in the face of known intolerable conditions."' On appeal,
the employer challenged only the district court's finding that the employer
acted with "deliberateness. ''2ea
Although the court stated that
"[d]eliberateness can be demonstrated by... circumstantial evidence," it
found "insufficient [evidence] to show a deliberate intent to discharge an
employee when there ha[d] been an attempt to accommodate that same
employee," even if the accommodation did not meet the requirements of
the Rehabilitation Act.' Although her employer "could have done more,
and should have done more" to provide accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of a "deliberate intent to force Johnson from her job."1
The Fourth Circuit held that evidence of a failure to accommodate a
disability, even when such action leaves in place untenable working condi-

tions, is not sufficient grounds to find discrimination in the absence of
impermissible employer intent." Despite the evidence that the employer's
accommodation attempts were inadequate under the standards of the Reha280. Id.
281. Id. at 130.
282. Id. at 13 1.
283. Id. ("Deliberateness can be demonstrated by actual evidence of intent by the employer to drive
the employee from the job, or circumstantial evidence ofsuch intent, including a series ofatons that
single out a plaintiff for differential treatment.").
284. Id. at 132. (acknowledging that the duty to accommodate employees under the Rehabilitation
Act complicates the application of Title Vll's requirement ofdifferential treatment to establish intent to
discharge but fails to develop separate standard for disability claims).
285. Id. (The court held that a different conclusion might "convert every failure to accommodate
under the Rehabilitation Act into a potential claim for constructive discharge," and would allow plaintiffs who have not been accommodated to quit their jobs "without first resorting to the administrative
and judicial remedies provided by Congress to mediate these disputes while the employment relationship can still be salvaged"). Id. at 131.
286. Id. at 130 (finding that an employer's inability to satisfactorily accommodate a disability does
not suffice to show a constructive discharge). In Johnson, the court held that although the NIH made
certain accommodations for Dr. Johnson's narcolepsy (limited flex-tim;, car pool assignments. job
reassignment), these accommodations failed to satisfy the requirements ofthe Rehabilitation Act. Id. at
132. These accommodations actually appear to have increased Dr. Johnson's stress level, making her
working conditions even less tolerable. Id. at 129-30.
287. Id. at 132. Previously, the Fourth Circuit had held that "[i]ntent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence, including a failure to act in the face ofknown intolerable conditions." Bristow v.
Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, although the Fourth Circuit prior to
Johnson had required civil rights plainfiffT to show that their employer possessed a "deliberate intent"
to force them to resign in order to establish a constructive discharge, it allowed such plaintiffs to meet
this burden by showing the existence of intolerable working conditions.
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bilitation Act, Johnson failed to state a claim because constructive discharge in the Fourth Circuit requires that the employer intended to drive
the employee from the job. 88 In both cases, the disabled employee felt
compelled to resign in order to escape unacceptable working conditions.
Under the "deliberate intent" standard set forth in Johnson, however, the
employee, even when faced with accommodations that the court viewed as
inadequate, was unable to maintain the claim for constructive discharge
under the Rehabilitation Act.
Accordingly, the constructive discharge standard used by the Fourth
Circuit and others requiring deliberate intent is inconsistent with the stated
policy of eliminating the barriers that prevent the disabled from enjoying
full participation in the workplace."8 9 For example, if an employer is
merely insensitive to the fact that the bathroom doors at his place of employment are too narrow for a wheelchair user, an employee has no constructive discharge claim if the employee decided to resign rather than not
use the bathroom during work hours or use alternative bathroom facilities
across the street. Even if the employee requested the accommodation and
the employer forgot to make the change, or made an inadequate accommodation, this would still be insufficient to establish a constructive discharge
under the Fourth Circuit's approach. Clearly, the standard for reasonable
accommodation should not require that the employee show that the employer actively wanted to get rid of him because of his disability. Rather,
the reasonable accommodation burden requires that even an employer who
288. Johnson, 991 F.2d at 131-32. Such a showing of deliberateness could only be made if the
employee demonstrated the "complete failure" to accommodate after repeated requests, or through
"direct evidence" of intent to force the employee from the job. Id. at 132.
289. Cf. Aviles-Marinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that a former employee
adequately alleged constructive discharge for political reasons after asserting that his employer caused
him an emotional crisis and forced him to take a leave of absence); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881
F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that a showing of repeated instances of grossly offensive conduct
and commentary would cause a reasonable employee to contemplate departure and claim constructive
discharge); Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that an attorney
could reasonably believe that a client who was demoted, unfairly criticized and forced to work late so
as to miss her bus could make a claim of constructive discharge); Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825
F.2d 458, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (adhering to the view that "the mere fact of discrimination, without
more, is insufficient to make out a claim of constructive discharge"); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a plaintiff must show some aggravating factors, rather
than a single isolated instance of employment discrimination, to support a claim of constructive discharge); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342-44 (10th Cir. 1986) (clarifing that constructive
discharge is a matter to be determined by the view of a reasonable person); Buckley v. Hosp. Corp. of
America, Inc., 758 F.2d 1525, 1530-31 (1 th Cir. 1985) (finding that a plaintiff who produced evidence
that she was humiliated after being demoted and offered a position under a supervisor with whom she
had personality conflicts in the past was sufficient to create a jury question on the issue of constructive
discharge); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a reasonable person could find that a pregnant employee who was told to either accept a new assignment or
leave to make room for a male employee was constructively discharged); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun.
Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a showing of unequal pay alone does not
support a finding of constructive discharge).
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fails to make a reasonable accommodation because of cluelessness or forgetfulness should be held responsible for that failure. Disabled employees
experience the same hardships under the forgetful employer scenario as
they do when the employer tries to actively get rid of them. For race and
gender, the laws require only that the employer refrain from discriminating; this is not true for disability discrimination. The ADA places a larger
burden on employers that courts must recognize. Congress designed the
ADA to prevent disability discrimination by all employers, the insensitive
as well as the haters. In the context of constructive discharge, the consequences when courts require proof of deliberate intent are clear. "It would
be a rare case indeed in which a hostile discriminatory purpose or subjecto discriminate solely on the basis of handicap could be
tive intent
''
shown. 2
Clearly, these circuit decisions create a major impediment to the full
implementation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. "[A] stringent requirement that an employer's intent be shown is 'inconsistent. .. with the
Although arguably the intent stanrealities of modem employment."''
dard is incorrect when applied to Title VII claims, the standard does much
greater harm to ADA claims. Most discriminatory failures to provide reasonable accommodations are not accompanied by such intent on the part of
the employer. This definition of the constructive discharge rule also decreases the employer's incentives to rectify and to reasonably accommodate an employee because the employer knows that the employee may tire
of seeking workplace changes and simply resign because of the continuing
discrimination. The rigid intent requirement therefore permits employers
to accomplish the effect of a discriminatory discharge without risking the
same on-going liability.292 Perhaps most perverse, the constructive dis290. Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981). Moreover, the

Fourth Circuit's concern in Johnson that affirming the district court's judgment would "threaten[ to
convert every failure to accommodate" into a constructive discharge claim is misplaced. Johnson, 991
F.2d at 131. An employer's failure to accommodate an employee's disability would support a claim of

constructive discharge only if the employee's working conditions are intolerable, and remain into!erable as a result of the employer's failure to provide effective accommodations. Often this wvill not be
the case. A failure reasonably to accommodate a disabled employee's desire for a promotion, for
example, will support a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, even though denials of promotions standing

alone rarely if ever are sufficient to support a claim of constructive discharge. Prewitt v. United States
Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292,307-09 (5th Cir. 1981); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-

66 (5th Cir. 1980) (not finding constructive discharge where employee received unequal pay, because
"a reasonable employee would [not] be forced to resign" due to "unequal pay alone"); ef. Satterwhite v.
Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding a constructive discharge where employer refused
to promote employee and where other aggravating circumstances were present); Clark v. Marsh. 665
F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same).
291. Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F. 2d 806, 814 n.17 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Bourque,617 F.2d at 65).

292. The constructive discharge doctrine forces an employer who illegally fires an employee to
continue paying damages until the employee can find substantially equivalent employment. RoTnSTEiN Er At-, supranote 188. This provides a substantial deterrent to continuing discriminatory practices. Id.
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charge standard not only lessens the incentives of employers not to discriminate, it actually forces employees to experience continual discrimination, and possibly risk to their health and safety, by requiring them to stay
in their jobs without reasonable accommodation to remain eligible for back
pay relief.

IV. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: ADOPTING AN EXPLANATION OF
BORROWING
In the three situations reviewed above, the courts have interpreted the
ADA in a manner that is inconsistent with the statute's goals. In the ADA
context, courts appear to be taking a shortcut rather than thoughtfully addressing the similarities and differences between the two employment discrimination statutes.293 Using shortcuts is not always a good method because courts can easily overlook subtle but important differences between
statutes; i.e., sometimes an orange is not an orange. Although drawing
analogies can provide guidance on how new congressional enactments
should be interpreted, actual borrowing between statutes should have limits.
Although the Supreme Court recently has decided several ADA
cases,294 it has not addressed the problem of inappropriate borrowing from
Title VII in ADA cases or attempted to place any constraints on that borrowing. Indeed, the Court has added to the confusion by failing to adopt a
consistent method of statutory interpretation for ADA claims. 95 Most recently, the Court adopted a narrow approach to the ADA's employment
provisions, refusing to defer to the EEOC's regulations concerning the
definitional section of the ADA.296 The Court's refusal to state what level
293. See, e.g., Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1049 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting the relevance
of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act to an ADA claim).
294. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S.
516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624
(1998);
295. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631, 636, 638-39, 646 (1998) (repeatedly relying on agency interpretation in the ADA context and stating that "[als the agency directed by Congress to issue implementing
regulations to render technical assistance explaining the responsibilities of covered individuals and
institutions, and to enforce Title III in court, the Department's views are entitled to deference") (citations omitted)). But see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481-82 (relying on a "plain meaning" interpretation of the
statute to avoid any need to inquire into the deference due to the EEOC positions). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's adoption of a strict textualist view of statutory interpretation, see Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future ofthe Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355-363 (1994);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 749, 749-52, 763-66 (1995); Peter L.
Strauss, On Resegregatingthe Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. Cr. REV. 429, 486-519.
296. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 ("Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of these interpreta.
tive guidelines, we have no need in this case to decide what deference is due."). This could be a case
where the Supreme Court has engaged in some improper borrowing from Title VII or merely is confused. For many years, the Supreme Court, as well as other federal courts, has failed to give the EEOC
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of judicial deference applies to interpretations of the ADA will undoubt-

edly lead some courts to conclude that those agencies lack the interpretative authority that most federal administrative agencies possess, If federal courts do not consider the EEOC's regulations and interpretative guidance in deciding ADA cases, they will be more likely to turn to Title VII's

precedent concerning like provisions when they have an interpretative
question. Thus, the Supreme Court has increased the likelihood that courts
will, by necessity, borrow from Title VII when deciding ADA claims.
Employment discrimination statutes contain different obligations based

on the nature of the discrimination to be addressed." Courts need to be
sensitive to these factors before they construe all employment discrimina-

tion statutes in the same manner, using the same procedural rules and definitions.?' To do this, courts need to examine information regarding the
regulations for Title VII the same level of respect and deference as other agencies receive. See Rebecca
Hanner "White, The EEOC the Courts. and Emplo)ment DiscriminationPolicy: Recognizing the
Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation,1995 UTAH L REv. 51, 89 (stating that "statutory
gaps and ambiguities [in the ADA] are to be resolved by the agency, with the courts deferring to the
agency's interpretation so long as that interpretation is reasonable") (footnote omitted); Theodore W.
Wern,Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretationsofthe CivilRights Act, the ADA and the ADEA: Is
the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 Omo ST. LJ. 1533. 1549 (1999) (reviewing recent court decisions and finding that the EEOC does not receive the same level of deference for its regulations as other
agencies). A partial explanation for this lack of deference to the EEOC's Title VII regulations may
result from the fact that the EEOC lacks congressional authorization to issue legally binding regulations
under that statute. However, the EEOC, under the ADA, has clear congressional authority to issue
regulations with the force of law. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (2000). Thus, its regulations with respect
to the ADA deserve more, not the same, deference as its regulations under Title VIL As to the EEOC's
interpretative guidance, the Supreme Court recently held that such agency pronouncements receive a
lower level of deference. Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63 (2000) (stating that
Skidmore deference, not Chevron, applies to informal agency interpretations).
297. The Court's decisions in Albertson 's. Murphy and Sutton all expressly reserved the question
whether the interpretations of the EEOC receive Chevron deference. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 563 n.0
("As the parties have not questioned the regulations and interpretative guidance promulgated by the
EEOC relating to the ADA's definitional section, for the purposes of this case, we assume, without
deciding, that such regulations are valid, and we have no occasion to decide what level of deference, if
any, they are due") (citation omitted); Murphy, 527 U.S. at 523 ("As in Sutton, we%
assume arguendo
that the... EEOC regulations regarding the disability determination are valid."); Sutton, 527 U.S. at
480 ("Because both parties accept these regulations as valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to decide this case, we have no occasion to consider what deference they are due, if any.").
298. The on-going intense battle within the Court over plain meaning versus legislative history
demonstrates, if nothing else, that whether language is plain or not often is only in the eyes of the
beholder. See generally WIL.AM N. EsKRIDG, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISlATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATiON OF PUBLIC PoucY 513-880 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing theories and doctrines of
statutory interpretation).
299. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
300. See Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T Respecting Legislative Judgments In Interpretative
Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1254, 1330 (2000) (suggesting that courts adopt an interpretative approach
that respects congressional judgments by relying on legislative history more fully); Steven P. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics ofStatutory Interpretation,62 U. COLO. L REV. 37 (1991) (arguing that the courts need to develop a new methodology for interpreting civil rights statutes); cf. Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes
Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L REV. 395, 400 (1950) (providing critical analy-sis of the various
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From these
ADA, including its regulations and legislative
sources, courts can develop a better understanding of the ADA and when it
may be inappropriate to import concepts from Title VII into the ADA.
This understanding should also result in decisions that more accurately
reflect Congress' intent to place the burden of reasonable accommodation
on the employer, and to provide the disabled with a meaningful tool against
discrimination in the workplace.
One of the major problems with this borrowing results from the federal
courts' failure to explain, or even acknowledge, that they are reapplying a
standard developed under Title VII. °2 Courts must openly acknowledge
this adoption of Title VII precedent so that future litigants can better understand when and where it will be applied."' The inconsistent application of
canons employed by the judiciary and showing how each canon has an opposite, yet recognized canon,
leading to a different result); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain
Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 242, 243 n.3 (1998) (disavowing claim "that it is useful to
employ bits and pieces of legislative reports or debates to resolve particular issues of meaning" and
instead advocating attention to "what problems concerned Congress and what was the general thrust of
its response").
301. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas Practical Reasoning,
42 STAi. L. REV. 321, 353-84 (1990) (arguing that courts should consider not only the statutory text
but a broad range of sources, including legislative history, legislative purposes, policy concerns and
evolutive factors). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCs 71-123 (1990);
Anthony T. Kronman, AlexanderBickel'sPhilosophy ofPrudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1605-06 (1985);
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1544 (1988). But see Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role ofthe United States Federal Courts In
Interpreting the Constitution and the Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 3, 31-34 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997) (arguing that "[i]ronically,... the more courts have relied
upon legislative history, the less worthy of reliance it has become"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CMI. L. REV. 533, 547-48 (1983) (contending that "[blecause legislatures comprise
many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet discoverable"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61-62
(1994) (cautioning against using legislative history so as to "devalue" statutory words). For a discussion on why a pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation may provide results more closely-related
to Congress' intent, see Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist? Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1240-41 (1996) (asserting that textualist statutory interpretation may
actually thwart legislative intent by applying the statute too narrowly).
302. See Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'g and suggestion for
reh 'g en bane denied (1998); Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1998); Duda
v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 1998). Some have speculated that courts have adopted a
narrow interpretation of the ADA due to a misunderstanding of the concept of disability and disability
discrimination. See Blanek, supra note 7; Colker, supra note 12.
303. Some commentators have speculated that the main reason may be that courts do not see any
difference between the two statutes. Because both Title VII and the ADA are facially similar and share
the same goal, equal employment opportunity, many courts may not understand that workplace discrimination experienced by disabled persons differs from that experienced by the protected classes
under Title VII. Matthew Diller, JudicialBacklash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKE.
LEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 19, 44, 46 (2000) (noting that "[t]he concept that equality requires differential
treatment, however, has long been contested in American society, as many have argued that different
treatment is inherently unequal" and that "many judges are not strongly imbued with the notion that
basic civil rights are at stake in ADA cases"); SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 105-41 (noting that enactment
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the ADA leads to fiustration, not only for plaintiffs but for employers as
well. To prevail under the ADA, some plaintiffs have resorted to applying
the statute's vague language to claims that advance agendas beyond increasing equality in the workplace for disabled individuals.3 On the other
side, employers cannot determine their responsibilities and what standards
will govern judicial review of their conduct.3" If courts developed the
ADA's precedent separately, rather than borrowing haphazardly from Title
VII, they would help both employers and employees better understand their
responsibilities under the statute which may ultimately lead to a more rational application of the law.
A potential solution to the courts' inappropriate borrowing would include: (1) more careful consideration of the reapplication of Title VII
precedent to the ADA, and (2) when such borrowing is appropriate, the
provision of a full explanation justifying the reapplicationP3 By explaining their rationale for looking to another statute and their apparent rejection
of the ADA's language, history and regulations in favor of Title VII precedent, courts will be forced to recognize and address the similarities and the
differences between the statutes. Failing to explain why they borrow opens
the courts to the charge that they are result-oriented, borrowing from Title
VII when it achieves the desired outcome for a case, and refusing to borrow when the ADA statute provides what the court perceives as the correct
result. Moreover, without an explanation as to why the court has borrowed, other courts will not know whether the interpretation of the ADA is
consistent.
Several scholars have argued that this duty of explanation, or duty of
candor, should be applied to statutory interpretations of all types. These
commentators have urged courts to be candid about how they approach
their decision-making role and to reveal the course that influenced their
final determination. They state that such an approach vill lead to better-

of the ADA was not preceded by the same kind of social upheaval that led to the cnctment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
304. Edward Feisenthal, Disabilities Act is Being Invoked In Diterse Cases, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 31,
1993, at BI (discussing the increasing use of the ADA by anti-smoking zealots).
305. See e.g, Vicki A. Ladeir & Gregory Schwarts, Psychiatric Disabilities,the Americans %ith
DisabilitiesAct and the New Workplace Violence, 21 BERKELEY. EtP. & LAB. L 246.246-47 (2000)
(discussing the difficult positions of employers when balancing employe rights verus safety con-

cers); Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing Genetic Medicineand MaragedCare,
34 WAKE FoREsT L REv. 849, 869-70 (1999) (examining the confision surrounding the ADA's
application to genetic testing).
306. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicialCandor, 100 HARV. L REV. 731,736-38 (1937)
(making "the case for candor"). On the value of candor in statutory interpretation, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, StatutoryInterpretationas PracticalReasoning,42 STAN. L REV.
321, 362-83 (1990). Scott A. Altman argues that judges should be candid, but not introspective because even a false belief in the existence of legal constraints will induce both candor and constraint.
See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor,89 MICH. L. REV. 296,297-99 (1990).
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reasoned decisions and more understandable
Applying this
approach to disability discrimination cases should correct much of what is
wrong with the ADA today.
Well-settled principles of administrative law plainly require agencies
to provide reasoned explanations for their legal interpretations. 308 The
"hard look" doctrine requires that the agencies offer detailed explanations
for their decisions. Under this doctrine, courts review agency rulemaking
to ensure that the agency has taken a "hard look" at all the relevant aspects
of a problem, has answered comments raised in the rulemaking record and
has advanced an adequate explanation of why it chose a particular solution
over other alternatives."° The explanations must show that agencies have
given "adequate consideration" to all factors made relevant by the control-

307. See Shapiro, supra note 306, at 739.
308. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Re.
viewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83, 129 (1994). Seidenfeld states:
Thus, in reviewing an agency's interpretation, courts should require the agency to identify
the concerns that the statute addresses and explain how the agency's interpretation took
those concerns into account. In addition, the agency should explain why it emphasized certain interests instead of others. In other words, the agency must reveal what led it to balance
the statutory aims as it did. The agency should also respond to any likely contentions that
its interpretations will have deleterious implications.
Id. See also Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedureand Process: Agency Duties ofExplanationfor Legal
Conclusions,48 RUTGERS L. REv. 313, 316 (1996) (concluding that at least in theory, "current doctrine
obliges courts to require agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their legal conclusions"). See
generallyCass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts,47
DUKE L. J. 1013, 1059-62 (1998) (arguing that, in the post-Chevron era, "administrative agencies have
become America's common law courts," charged with "apply[ing] incompletely specific legal doctrines
to new contexts" and with "supply[ing] new understandings of those doctrines").
309. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting
that court will require that the commission provide "a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies
and standards are being deliberately changed, not causally ignored"); see also Harold Leventhal, EnvlronmentalDecisionmakingand the Role ofthe Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (1974) (stating that
"[t]he court does not make the ultimate decision, but it insists that an official or agency take a 'hard
look' at all relevant factors"). For a discussion of the application of the hard look doctrine and Its
effects on the rulemaking process, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deosstfylng" the
Rulemaking Process,41 DUKE LJ. 1385, 1410-26 (1992) (arguing that the threat of "overly intrusive
judicial review" causes agency decisionmakers to "be reluctant to undertake new rulemaking initiatives,
to experiment with more flexible regulatory techniques, and to revisit old rulemaking efforts"); Thomas
0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossificationof Rulemaking: A Response to ProfessorSeldenfeld, 75
TEX. L. REV. 525, 539-56 (1997) (contending that Seidenfeld's analysis overlooks "the larger point that
judicial review can be a potent weapon in the hands of entities that are opposed to protective legislation"); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossficatlon: Rethinking Recent Proposalsto Modi Judicial
Review ofNotice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEx. L. REV. 483,490-99 (1997) (identifying a "regulatory paralysis" and stating that "[the literature on ossification identifies the hard look doctrine of
judicial review as the culprit most responsible for discouraging agency rulemaking"). See generally
Stephen F. Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U. CHt. L. REV. 401, 403 (1975) (considering "under what legal theories and in
what circumstances, a court may be justified in imposing procedural burdens upon an agency engaged
in rulemaking").
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ling statute?'" All of these requirements can be understood as an effort to

ensure that the agency's decision was a "reasoned" exercise of discretion
and not merely a response to political pressure.3
Subsequently, courts
have applied a form of the hard look doctrine
to
the
review
of other areas
3 12
of decision-making by agencies and courts.
Applying a review structure similar to the hard look doctrine to a district court ADA decision that borrows from Title VII would require that the

court provide an explanation as to why it believed that such borrowing was

appropriate in that case3 3 If the court decides to borrow precedent from
another statute rather than rely on the statute at issue, the court must demonstrate that it has at least carefully considered the interpretative problem.
For example, if the courts had to explain the reasoning behind their deci-

sion to impose Title VII constructive discharge standards on the ADA, they
are more likely to develop a standard of constructive discharge that specifi-

cally addressed the burdens and responsibilities the ADA imposes on employers, rather than assume that the two statutes are the same.

This is not to say that the courts will adopt completely different results
in these cases. At least plaintiffs and defendants will know why they have
adopted different standards. However, the explanation will provide other
courts with a better means of evaluating the manner in which the court
reached its decision and whether they wish to adopt the same reasoning and
approach. Because there will be less confusion about varying interpreta-

310. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983). The
court noted that:
[Ain agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important asp.ct of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.
Id.
311. See id. ("iT]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choices mrade.'"); Jim
Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and the FederalRegulatory Efforts to
Restructurethe Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L REV. 763, 822 (reporting that court involvement
in the dialogue on the proper meaning of Federal Power Act adds to the legitimacy of the resulting
interpretation); Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk. Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the
Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L REV. 621, 625 (1994) (defending the courts' adoption of the hard look doctrine, and describing how judges forced an agency defending a rule to show that is had taken a "'hard
look' at all the relevant aspects of the problem, answered comments raised in the rulemaing record,
and advanced an adequate explanation of why it chose this particular solution over other altemative3").
312. The "hard look" doctrine has been applied broadly to a variety of court activities. See, e-g.,
Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1350-52 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that the application of a standard of evidentiary reliability is consistent with the hard look doctrine, under which the
district courts have a duty to evaluate the reliability of expert opinion testimony, even after such testimony is in the record, in order to determine whether the case should go to thejury).
313. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulationand the HardLookDoctrlne,193 SUP. Cr. REy. 177, 18182 (1983) (noting that the hard look doctrine imposes a significant burden on an agency defending a
rule).
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tions of the ADA, this duty will result in more rational decisions.
V. CONCLUSION

The enactment of the ADA shows the powerful influence of analogy.
As Matthew Diller has stated:
By analogizing the issues facing people with disabilities to the
problems faced by [other] minorit[ies], advocates were able to harness some portion of the persuasive power of the civil rights
movement. The analogy provided a powerful new way of thinking
and talking about the problems faced by people with disabilities
and suggested
a series of concrete and achievable legislative
t4
3

goals.

More recently, however, the case law interpreting the ADA has demonstrated that the analogy to Title VII has its limits. This Article urges that
the courts consider the policies that underlie the ADA, the broad remedial
goals of the statute, the past history of discrimination against the disabled,
and, most importantly, the fundamental differences between racial discrimination and discrimination against the disabled, before they engage in
the wholesale importation of the Title VII standards.
Persons with disabilities face significant obstacles to full and gainful
employment in our society. Unfortunately, many of these barriers can be
attributed to ignorance or neglect on the part of employers. Congress enacted the ADA with its reasonable accommodation requirement to address
these obstacles. Many courts, however, have narrowly interpreted the
ADA by reflectively borrowing concepts and precedent from Title VII.
Because Title VII addresses a different form of discrimination and provides
different remedies, some of its precedent has severely limited the ability of
ADA plaintiffs to recover. In effect, by borrowing, courts have significantly weakened the requirement that employers comply fully and effectively with the requirements of the ADA.
This borrowing, and its harmful consequences, forces an examination
of whether Title VII's concepts of discrimination should fully apply to
discrimination under the ADA. In some respects, Title VII precedent
serves as a useful analogue to ADA cases. However, the continuing failure
by some courts to appreciate the subtle but fundamental differences between different types of discrimination and the subsequent misguided
transplant of Title VII law, continues to frustrate disabled persons seeking
redress for discrimination in the workplace.

314. Diller, supranote 303, at 51.
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